Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-131 *10 July 1995*

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'No Progress' in Geneva Albania-FYROM Talks

AU0807140095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to all expectations, no progress was made in the Albanian-Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] talks that started in Geneva yesterday with the mediation of Ambassador Gert Ahrens. Three topics were to be discussed—mainly the question of higher education of Albanians, the law on local administration, and the use of languages.

Reports from Geneva state that these talks were permeated by a more evident antagonism than until now. The Macedonian authorities [illegible] the legalization of Tetovo University. This time, as well, the Albanian side showed determination about the legitimate demands and stated that it will not give them up.

On the other hand, Ambassador Ahrens pledged to meet the demands of Albanians in conformity with documents of international organizations.

Talks will continue, but the time and date when they will resume have not yet been determined.

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Border Commission Reports Drop in Incidents

LD0807192995 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1830 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The meeting of the central Albanian-Yugoslav commission for the settlement of the border incidents took place in Tirana. According to the Albanian Interior Ministry, the incidents presented by both sides for the period May 1994-April 1995 were discussed. The number of the incidents during this period has lowered by 50 percent compared to a year before.

Concerning the incidents, constituting the violation of the territorial integrity, the commission presented evidences for the activity of the Albanian border authorities who have caught Serbian or Montenegrin citizens unarmed, (?who regarded) the passing of the border by the armed men constitutes a violation of the integrity only. The commission concluded that both sides should engage for the prevention of the conflict. The respective protocol was signed and all the duties for the local commissions were laid.

The coming meeting of the Albania-Yugoslav commission for the border incidents will take place in Belgrade next June.

Country To Join Paris Convention on Trademarks

LD0807200795 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1830 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A delegation made up of the head of the science and technology committee of Albania, Maksim Konomi, and the director of the license office, Albert Kuci, deposited to the general director of the world organization of the intellectual property the instruments of the admission of Albania to the Paris Convention for the Protection of the Industrial [as heard] Property in the treaty of cooperation for the [word indistinct] in the Madrid Agreement for the international registration of the trademarks. These treaties will come into effect three months from the deposition date.

Former President Alia Released From Prison

AU0707140195 Paris AFP in English 1344 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, July 7 (AFP)—Ramiz Alia, the last communist Albanian president, was freed from prison Friday following a decision by Tirana's appeal court, official sources said.

Alia, 69, had spent 540 days in jail. [passage omitted]

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Pirinski Views Foreign Relations, Security

AU1007081495 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 5 Jul 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski by Tatyana Vasileva; place and date not given: "Foreign Policy Cannot Be Reduced to Arbitrary Geometric Figures"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vasileva] Mr. Pirinski, could you please comment on the claim that you are the only member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] cabinet who is flirting with President Zhelev?

[Pirinski] I view flirting as a concept that belongs in other spheres. However, concerning relations between the government and the president, one could hardly speak of an individual attitude, because the foreign minister is engaged in areas in which the president also participates. I have always strictly adhered to protocol. I have never given any reason to believe that I deviated from protocol.

[Vasileva] Is Bulgaria's security threatened by the policy of the neighboring Balkan states?

[Pirinski] There is no direct threat. The countries have a positive attitude toward us and admit that we are conducting a policy that is not subjected to ad hoc considerations and that adheres to peacefully resolving conflicts and equality in bilateral relations, something that should not be to the detriment of third countries. The problem is that the cloud of instability is hovering over our region.

[Vasileva] Our cabinets have so far refrained from direct contact with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Could someone accuse you of colluding with Belgrade?

[Pirinski] The answer depends on two considerations, which apply to every country that respects itself: The first is what the interests of the specific state are and do its foreign policy moves correspond to its basic interests. The second—every state is a part of the international community in which it exists, and as such, it cannot ignore its commitments. From the standpoint of both considerations, my visit to Belgrade was well founded. Good relations with all Balkan states have a primary importance for Bulgaria. Simultaneously, Bulgaria is pointing out that it adheres to lifting the sanctions, together with seeking a political solution to the crisis.

[Vasileva] Is the suspicion that the cabinet is cooperating with Greece and Serbia at the expense of Turkey justified?

[Pirinski] Everyone sees in our foreign policy moves what he wants to see. Our government adheres to the European priority, conducting an active regional policy and developing bilateral relations with the basic, traditional, and new partners of Bulgaria. I visited Croatia and had an unofficial talk in Varna with the Romanian foreign minister. At that time, while I was in Yugoslavia, our prime minister visited Greece. Afterward, the Turkish foreign minister came to Sofia, and now President Demirel is visiting. Nevertheless, many commentaries on our foreign policy contain the arbitrary conclusion that our contacts with Serbia and Greece are almost an act of "socialist policy...."

[Vasileva] There is another interpretation, according to which the Athens-Sofia-Ankara triangle of stability is turning into the Athens-Sofia-Belgrade triangle.

[Pirinski] It certainly is tempting to think in terms of geographic figures; however, I do not think this is a serious effort.

[Vasileva] When will our dispute with Romania regarding the second bridge across the Danube end?

[Pirinski] It must end. I sincerely hope so, because right now there are different opinions. The Romanian side insists on the Nikopol-Turnu Magurele location because they claim that this is the most direct route between Sofia and Bucharest. However, the most intensive traffic is along the West European route, through Romania and Bulgaria to the Mediterranean. In this context, the bridge should be between Vidin and Calafat. I hope that the logic of the international transportation routes will be honored.

[Vasileva] Is there a conflict between you and the prime minister regarding foreign policy? When will Bulgaria officially declare its willingness to join the EU and NATO?

[Pirinski] There is no conflict. The theses that are being launched are unworthy. They are an attempt to find something that does not exist, or perhaps an attempt to inspire something. The moment at which we will declare our willingness to join those organizations will be in accordance with our national strategy on joining the EU in the light of the Cannes decisions. The moment will not be subjected to ad hoc considerations and will not be postponed in the distant future. Bulgaria will declare its willingness to become a member when it thinks that it is sufficiently prepared to become an EU member.

[Vasileva] What is your attitude toward the idea of conducting a policy of active neutrality in foreign relations?

[Pirinski] Our public comments in rather broad borders the variants of Bulgaria's future position as participant or nonparticipant in this or that structure. I would not like to comment on the neutrality alternative. The

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essence of the matter is what is best for Bulgaria's national security.

[Vasileva] And what is best for Bulgaria's national security?

[Pirinski] An unequivocal answer cannot be given at present, because the European structures are developing, and so are the realities around us. What could clearly be said is that the initial impulse of finding simpler solutions—for example, becoming a member of a certain organization and expecting this to solve everything—is over. Now people are talking about the need to find a more complex attitude about developing the West European Union and NATO and expanding the economic structures within the EU. What is meant here is not only a dialogue, but also agreements with partners of Europe and NATO, such as Russia, something that could create more security and not a new tension. Therefore, the best is to not forget what the basic interests of every country are and seek the optimal solution that never comprises a single decision.

[Vasileva] Would you be a candidate for the post of president if the BSP nominates you?

[Pirinski] This is a trivial question, because it is asked without noting the real subject of the presidential elections and the candidates for the post of president. This has become a gossip subject, almost a comical theme of conversation. I do not intend to comment on it.

Zhelev Protests Against Repassage of Ecology Bill

AU0807140395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev has sent a letter to National Assembly chairman Blagovest Sendov, in which he points out that, regardless of the fact that he had returned to the National Assembly the Bill on Amendments and Addenda to the Environment Protection Bill for a new discussion, and regardless of the arguments in which he had stressed contradictions with Bulgaria's Constitution and the international commitments our country has assumed, the bill has been adopted again.

The president expresses his conviction that by adopting those amendments and addenda to the bill the state is returning to the period of authoritarian decisions.

Every act of the National Assembly must be within the framework of the constitution, and every act of the executive power must be based on the law and not solely on the expedience of the administrative decisions, the Bulgarian president stresses.

President Zhelev points out that the amendments to the bill's section dealing with the effect on the environment jeopardizes the constitutionally recognized and guaranteed right of the citizens to information and is an obstacle to their participation in the decisionmaking process in the area of environmental protection.

In his letter to Blagovest Sendov, President Zhelev poses the following questions:

Do we have enough legal and moral justification to request an exchange—a part of our debt for a part of our environment, and could we pay debts with our environment?

Could we really host the important and representative Environment for Europe international forum?

IAEA Sees No Seismic Danger at Belene Site

AU0807140295 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no seismic danger that does not allow the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant—this is the conclusion of the experts of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] mission, who studied the issue for the past five days. They confirmed a previous conclusion made in 1990, according to which the construction site is suitable.

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Havel on Talks on Relations With Germany

LD0907150295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 9 Jul 95

[Interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Eva Hulkova at Lany presidential residence; date not given; from the regular "Conversations at Lany" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hulkova] President, the sofa on which I am sitting is the one on which Rudolf Scharping, leader of the German Social Democratic Party [SPD], was sitting literally a while ago [7 July], during your relatively long talks on Czech-German relations. You said after the talks that you had discussed those relations at a very concrete level. With regard to this fragile area, the words "very concrete level" are, in my view, quite important.

[Havel] As you know, Czech foreign policy and Czech diplomacy have recently launched a certain initiative that I would not label as a combat offensive but rather as a certain initiative targeted at Germany and aimed at clearing away the little stones lying on the path between our two countries. So far, this initiative has been really successful in that never before have so many German politicians travelled to this country. We have never had so many talks with them, and in Bundestag there has never been so much debate on the Czech Republic or the relations between the Czech lands and Germany. [passage omitted: the main principles of the initiative are well known]

We would like to see the adoption of a parliamentary declaration by both parliaments, expressing the willingness of the two countries to look ahead, to build better relations and, in particular, not to return to legal discussions on some controversial issues of the past. Of course, this declaration would be accompanied by other activities, such as joint foundations set up to pay compensations, the setting up of the Czech-German Forum and so on. [passage omitted: these issues are widely debated]

Our talks with SPD leader Mr. Scharping were very concrete. We discussed not only what should be done but also when it should happen. [passage omitted: repeats the point but gives no details]

If this succeeds then it would be a new and historical event as this would really mean some kind of a settlement after the decades of tense or unresolved relations between our country and Germany. We must hope and do all we can for this to happen. There is not much time left, and all this should happen during the summer or in the autumn. Later timing would be less favorable due to, among other things, the forthcoming elections in our country. [passage omitted: Havel explains his philosohpy of truth as presented at several occasions last week, speaks on the agenda of his meeting with Civic Democratic Alliance Chairman Jan Kalvoda last week and his meeting with filmmakers at Lany last week]

Dyba, EU Commissioner Sign PHARE Program

LD0707181995 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hans van den Broek, the EU commissioner in charge of external relations with Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, and Czech Economy Minister Karel Dyba today signed a several-year-long indicative program PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary], according to which the Czech Republic will be provided with 11 billion korunas. This sum is to be dedicated to the preparation of the Czech Republic for its membership in the European Union. Hans van den Broek commented on the importance of the agreement.

[Begin Van den Broek recording, in English with superimposed Czech translation] The agreements that we were just able to sign, the first being a several-years-long indicative program of cooperation, bring means and possibilities of integration of the Czech Republic into European markets. The whole process naturally contains a great deal of aspects, for instance in legislation—Czech laws will become closer to the EU legislation. Here we are able to offer know-how, and assistance can be given where necessary and where indicated by the Czech Government. [end recording]

Klaus: Privatization 'Slowing Drawing to an End'

AU0707122495 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 3 Jul 95 p 11

[Article by "ada, nig": "The National Property Fund Will Not Be Abolished Next Year, Says Klaus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Government wants the National Property Fund (FNM) to fulfill its tasks as soon as possible so that it can be abolished. Nevertheless, unlike the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Property, it will not be abolished in the course of this electoral term," states Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in his written reply to an interpellation from Deputy Jiri Vyvadil (Czech Social Democratic Party).

The FNM cannot be abolished next year because it still has more than one-half of its work—the sale of property and shares worth roughly 140 billion korunas [Kc]—ahead of it. Property with an aggregate book value of approximately Kc938 had been included in large-scale

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privatization, which falls within the FNM's jurisdiction. Just under two-thirds of this volume has been transferred into the hands of new owners to date, with coupon privatization accounting for the largest proportion of the already realized part—57 percent.

In his reply, the prime minister considers the process of privatization in the Czech Republic, which, in his opinion, is the most advanced of all of the postcommunist countries. In 1990, some 98 percent of all business property was in the hands of the state or under its direct control. By June 1995, 80 percent of this property has been denationalized, so the influence of the state on the economy has significantly declined and, from this point of view, the privatization process is slowly drawing to an end.

As Klaus notes in his reply, a substantial part of denationalization took the form of property restitution (property with a book value of Kc70-120 billion), transformation of cooperatives (Kc200-250 billion), transfer of ownership to communities (over Kc350 billion), and the so-called small-scale privatization (Kc21 billion).

New Chief of Economic Counterintelligence Named

AU0707124995 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 4 Jul 95 p 2

[CTK report: "Economic Counterintelligence Will Be Headed by Sula's Former Subordinate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Police Vice President Jan Zatorsky has entrusted Evzen Sirek, head of the Analysis and Data-Processing Department of the Service for Uncovering Corruption and Serious Economic Crime [SOKZH], with the management of SOKZH. This was announced by a staffer of the SOKZH director's secretariat.

Sirek replaces as director of economic counterintelligence Jan Sula, who left the Police Corps on 30 June at his own request. Sula has headed SOKZH since its founding in January 1994. Until then, he was chief of the Police Corps' Service for the Protection of Economic Interests (SOEZ). Some of the SOEZ's powers were taken over in January 1994 by the Security Information Service [BIS], whereupon SOEZ started to operate under the name "SOKZH." The economic counterintelligence service became publicly known through its participation in uncovering a number of serious cases.

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Meciar Said in Poor Health; Kozlik Hospitalized

AU0707134395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Jul 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "ad": "Sergej Kozlik in Hospital"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The reason for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's indisposition and unexpected departure from the Swiss resort of Crans Montana was a virus-related illness. This was confirmed to us by an unnamed Government Office staffer. According to another source, it was the consequence of a light sunstroke the prime minister suffered during his visit to Cannes, France. The health problems had already manifested themselves on his arrival in Switzerland. According to eyewitnesses, he was pale and had an ague. The signs of illness were evident also during his stay in Zurich and Crans Montana. Immediately before his address to the economic forum, the indisposition made necessary his premature return to Slovakia. According to confidential information, the prime minister's state of health has stabilized, but it still cannot be said that he is in a good shape.

As the spokeswoman of the Slovak Government Office Press and Information Department told us on 4 July, Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and finance minister, is also having health problems. We managed to ascertain that he has been in the hospital for the past four days and will not be released until tomorrow. Also, in his case, the reason for his work disability is a virus disease. Sergej Kozlik's illness manifested itself for the first time during his return from Crans Montana, when he had breathing problems. Since then, he supposedly twice lost consciousness, which prompted his hospitalization. We will try to inform you about the two politicians' state of health tomorrow.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 6 July on page 2 carries a 150-word report by "an" entitled "Sergej Kozlik in Hospital," which quotes Vladimir Majtan, director of the Interior Ministry's hospital in Bratislava, as saying that Kozlik's hospitalization was not caused by "a coronary incident but by an ordinary influenza-type disease." According to Majtan, Kozlik's hospitalization was used for a "comprehensive examination of the patient's state of health," which is "improving."]

Schenk, Norway's Kosmo Discuss Relations

LD0707164995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk received Norwegian Defense Minister Jorgen Kosmo in Bratislava today. They discussed the further development of bilateral relations and the building of an all-European security system. Juraj Schenk confirmed Slovakia's unequivocal interest in full membership in the Western European Union and NATO.

Kosmo went on to visit the ZTS Dubnica nad Vahom works, specializing in defense technology. In the afternoon he ended his visit to Slovakia.

Hungarian Minority Leader Criticizes Treatment

AU0807173095 Vienna KURIER in German 8 Jul 95 p 3

[Article by "J.P.": "These Steps Are Not in Harmony With Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bela Bugar is the head of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH) in Slovakia. The most moderate of the three parties of the Hungarian minorities holds seven seats in parliament.

He says about the Hungarian protests in southern Slovakia: "They were organized by the Association of Hungarian Teachers. Radical demands were made, such as a school boycott in the fall. It was also threatened that the next demonstrations would be held in Bratislava. But then even a little brawl would be sufficient—and we would have open conflict! That is what I am afraid of."

Regarding the government's minority policy, he noted: "This is a policy of intimidation. The Hungarian teachers were threatened with being fired if they did not support bilingual schools. This government is taking steps that are not in harmony with democracy. The Meciar government is rescinding all decentralizing measures implemented by the previous government (Moravcik). Concessions that were made to us during communism are being taken away again. This does not affect just the Hungarian minority."

Concerning autonomy, he stated: "Culture and the school sector clearly belong in the hands of the minorities. We also want more rights for local self-administration. In my view, the demand for territorial autonomy does not solve our problems, even though Hungarian politicians keep voicing it more frequently."

He said about Prime Minister Meciar: "In his place, I would grant the minorities entire rights so that they felt at home here."

Regarding the basic treaty with Hungary, he pointed out: "It is okay, even though verification of its observance has not been set down. We will vote 'yes' during the vote in parliament—unless the parliament earlier adopts the language law, which is hostile to minorities."

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Article Views Poll Results on Kovac Referendum

AU0707170495 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Jul 95 p 1

[Article by "b": "Opponents of President Kovac's Dismissal Outnumber Advocates Two to One"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The FOCUS agency carried out a representative public opinion survey from 3 to 15 June 1995. Nine hundred and ninety-six people were asked the following question and answered as indicated:

Imagine that a referendum were to be held this coming weekend. How would you vote if, in this referendum, you were asked: Do you advocate President Michal Kovac's dismissal from his post?

	Percent
Yes	22.4
No	44.2
I would not take part	27.3
Do not know	6.1

The president's dismissal was advocated by 54.9 percent of the political supporters of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], 43.5 percent of Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] supporters, 38.9 percent of Slovak National Party [SNS] supporters, 6.7 percent of Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] supporters, 3.0 percent of Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] supporters, 5.3 percent of Hungarian Coalition [MK] supporters, and 5.2 percent of Democratic Union [DU] supporters.

Opposed were 81.8 percent of DU supporters, 80.0 percent of MK supporters, 76.1 percent of KDH supporters, 71.7 percent of SDL supporters, 33.3 percent of SNS supporters, 17.4 percent of ZRS supporters, and 20.1 percent of HZDS supporters.

A total of 26.1 percent of polled ZRS supporters, 22.2 percent of SNS supporters, 19.0 percent of HZDS supporters, and 18.3 percent of SDL supporters would not participate in the referendum. The reply "do not know" was given by 13.0 percent of ZRS supporters and 6.0 percent of HZDS supporters. Between 2.6 and 5.6 percent of the polled supporters of the other parties did not know how they would reply to the above question.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 6 July on page 4 carries a 700-word commentary by Rado Stevcik entitled "Citizens Do Not Want To Dismiss the President." The commentator views the fact that "almost three-quarters of citizens have a negative attitude toward the dismissal of the head of state" as a "political slap in the face for those who are feverishly trying to prove to President Kovac that the people of this country elected them and not him." The support of "only" 54.9 percent of HZDS supporters for Kovac's dismissal, in particular, is seen by Stevcik as a "great disappointment" for the HZDS chairman. The commentator believes that "the HZDS chairman's antipresidential campaign is leading him up a blind alley" because "the replacement of the president by means of a referendum has turned out to be unfeasible."]

Ministry Puts Forward 'Outline' of 1996 Budget

AU0707174495 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Jul 95 p 1

[Article by Alica [illegible]ianova: "Statisticians Briefed Government on Fa[illegible] Food Prices"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—At its regular meeting on 4 July, the Government of the Slovak Republic discussed a Slovak Statistical Office report on the development of consumer prices in June 1995. According to preliminary data, the price level did not change, on aggregate, compared with May. Food prices even declined by 1.5 percent, according to this report, while the cost of services went up 0.3 percent, prices in catering rose 0.4 percent, and prices of nonfood items rose 0.7 percent. [passage omitted]

A new concept for drafting the 1996 state budget, as well as an outline of its points of departure and risks, was the subject of a report submitted to the government by Sergej Kozlik, deputy prime minister and minister of finance. Because of Sergej Kozlik's hospitalization following a bout of weakness [zachvat slabosti] on the plane during his return flight from Crans Montana, however, the report was defended by Jozef Magula, state secretary at the Ministry of Finance. According to the report, the draft state budget for next year should be submitted to the government by 31 October 1995, with the following specifications: The budget deficit will not exceed 2.5 percent of the GDP; priority will be given to financing the needs of the state and social needs guaranteed by the Constitution; discussions willbe

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held with the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic on the possibility of using its resources [to finance budget expenditures]; and designated monopoly state-owned companies and shareholding companies in which the state has a majority will be made to pay a special profit tax.

The macroeconomic points of departure in drafting the state budget for 1996 include a projected GDP growth of 3 to 5 percent, an inflation rate of under 10 percent, and an unemployment rate of under 13 percent. The Ministry of Finance regards as risks of the state budget for next year the development of foreign trade with the Czech Republic and the projected increase of gas and electricity prices.

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Prime Minister Gyula Horn Interviewed

On Successes, Failures, EU

LD0907225595 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 9 Jul 95

[Studio interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by correspondent Pal Szombati; from "The Week" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Szombati] Prime Minister Gyula Horn is "The Week's" studio guest tonight. I welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister. Let us start with a quick question: Was, in your view, the government's first year in office a success or a failure?

[Horn] It was not at all a failure. We have achieved results as well. Nobody could really expect that within one year—which started and continued with putting things right...[pauses] Naturally, there are problems, the solution of which is more difficult and there are fields where we have achievements. But the time will have to come when the citizens can also sense these achievements.

[Szombati] What was the greatest success and the biggest failure during the first year?

[Horn] I think that we have managed to halt a further decline in the economy, and economic growth has started. There has been a significant improvement in our financial situation and in the position of the balance of payments over the past few months and, contrary to rumors about an opposite trend, we have started to move toward a more equitable baring of public burden.

[Szombati] What about the failures?

[Horn] Well, there have been problems we have not managed to solve, and there is a certain delay in the implementation of government decisions. However, we also have to take into consideration that it is difficult to make decisions without violating interests. In a transition period it has to be considered which interests are the primary ones. In my view, the country's interests are the basic interests. [passage omitted]

[Szombati] You, Mr. Prime Minister, have several times repeated that the Socialists promised blood and tears in the election campaign. It seems that you have kept your promises. What can the government promise now?

[Horn] We will lead the country out of the crisis and manage the transition. Believe me, when I say that we are not taking these hard measures for fun, but for the interest of the nation, the country. [passage omitted]

[Szombati] This week you criticized the International Monetary Fund. You said there was a limit to the Hungarians' patience, too. Meanwhile, we should not forget that the previous government had made promises that it was unable to fulfill. Was your statement, or criticizm really addressed to abroad or home?

[Horn] Look, first of all, I would like to correct you. REUTER asked me about the IMF and I answered this question. For the IMF representative made a statement after the Constitutional Court's decision saying that we have to insist on the proposal that the budget revenue should not exceed 3.5 percent in 1996. I reacted to this statement. When we were in Washington—and this is not a secret—we had a very sharp debate with the IMF leaders.

What I am saying is that we continue to carry on on this path, we have been cutting back the budget deficit, the deficit in the balance of payments, and so on. However, no country in a transition period—particularly not Hungary—can be expected to reduce these deficits to such an extent within a year without the danger of serious social problems. From President Clinton through EU leaders, to the leaders of the IMF, the World Bank, and other international financial organizations, all say that there is a need for a financial-economic stabilization and transformation process, but at the same time, there is also a need for political stability.

If we try to put an unbearable burden on society, political stability will be put in question. We have to take this into consideration. What I would like to see confirmed in agreements is that we are on the right path and that we have been persistently implementing the measures that comply with international requirements.

What they should watch is the trend and not the question whether we cut the deficit by half—or by a larger percentage—within a year. I do not believe that there is a government—even in the Western world—that could undertake such an enormous burden in one step. Realities will have to be taken into consideration.

[Passage omitted] [Szombati] Will you comment on the doubts raised by Ivan Szabo, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum? Will the government be called Horn government by 1998?

[Horn] Society trusts us, and the coalition and the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] parliamentary group supports us—yes, it will be called Horn government. [passage omitted]

[Szombati] How do you assess coalition cooperation with the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] today? There was some tension earlier, but since 12 March, when the Bokros package was announced, this tension appears to be reduced, although the SZDSZ has started to be firmer in certain questions.

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[Horn] Look, this government has never been a snobbish or arrogant government. When we made a mistake, we admitted it. Instead of insisting on mistakes we corrected them. [passage omitted] I do not believe in the existence of neoliberal, or any kind of liberal, or conservative, or left-wing solution for the transformation of the economy to a market economy. [passage omitted]

We have to start with the real conditions. When we took office on 15 July 1994, it was not known that the internal state debt would grow threefold within four years. [passage omitted] A large number of companies, industries, and regions were left behind by the previous government. In the name of legal continuity we had to undertake obligations related to compensation. Interests payable after the bank and debtor consolidation program put a burden of 100 billion forints on the state every year. [passage omitted]

A lot of factors have restricted the government's scope for maneuver. Therefore, it is not too ethical when the opposition, particularly the former government parties, blame us for what was caused by them. [passage omitted]

It has been mentioned by Jozsef Szajer [Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party], that we dismissed government members when we took radical steps. It is not the case. There were people who were able to stand by a program, and those who were not. [passage omitted]

[Szombati] How do you see cooperation within the government coalition? Has it improved since 12 March?

[Horn] I said in January that we had to put an end to dispute among ourselves, and cooperation within the Coalition Coordination Council had to be reformed, and it did take place. I do not wish to go into details. Now when we have debates, we settle them among ourselves. [passage omitted]

It is another question, that sometimes there are pronouncements by certain deputies of the coalition partner that are hard to accept, but I do not react to them. For me the decisive question is that we should be able to have a normal cooperation with the three Free Democrat ministers in the government and to agree on basic questions and everybody should stand by and implement decisions that fall under their authority. [passage omitted]

[Szombati] Leading Western politicians make rather mixed and ambiguous statements regarding Hungary's future EU membership. [passage omitted] How can we find our way in these statements? What is the determining line here?

[Horn] Before answering this question, let me return to a comment by Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Contrary to him, the entire Western world, and even our Eastern neighbors, say that Hungary's international reputation has significantly increased over the past year. It was said by somebody at the last Cannes summit that the conclusion of the Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty is of historical significance. President Clinton has also expressed his appreciation. [passage omitted] The outside world appreciates this. I have to stress that I cannot imagine any other kind of normal way forward for Hungary.

Regarding the EU, Hungary has always taken into consideration the large internal tension among EU member states. I do not only refer to difficulties in the decisionmaking mechanism, but also to the financial difficulties in connection with the system of subsidies.

Well, we have always presented our concrete proposals by taking all this into consideration, and this is what we did in Essen and following that as well.

The only country that has come up with a modernization program—a program on accession to the EU—is Hungary. We are not only holding coordination talks, but the EU is also financing the preparation of this program. The only country that has a three-year legal harmonization plan is Hungary. The only country that has submitted a plan on the method of joining trans-European transport and other networks is our country. We discussed this in detail with Chancellor Vranitzky on 7 July. [passage omitted] All this has been appreciated by the European Union.

[Szombati] Let us now turn toward the East. In our following film we deal with the situation on the Hungarian-Ukrainian border, and with the idea of eventually creating a free trade zone. We will then discuss the fact that you have raised the issue of introducing the visa requirement. [passage omitted]

[Szombati] Mr. Prime Minister, you were the politician who opened our western borders six years ago, thereby dismantling the Iron Curtain. The introduction of visas is now being considered for our southern and eastern neighbors. What is at issue here? Will there again be an Iron Curtain, but in the East now?

[Horn] That is not what is at issue. It is a question of eliminating those conditions and of improving the situation—and what preoccupies me and most people in the country is that the number of illegal workers can be estimated at over 100,000. They inundate the cities, and cause very serious public security problems—and I do not wish to continue this list.

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When I was most recently in Kiev we agreed on the renovation of the road-bridge at Zahony—the measures since then include a diversion of traffic, too. Therefore, the conditions there must be altered and improved, but at the same time, I told the Ukrainian president and prime minister that if we were unable to make progress within a few weeks, we will be compelled...

[Szombati, interrupting] Does this mean that...

[Horn, continuing] ...to apply the visa requirement. They did not protest at this. I told President Iliescu in Cannes about this intention of ours, and I instructed the ministries concerned to work out the details of this.

I, for my part, naturally do not wish to penalize the Hungarians near the border, but there must be a form of filtering. Allow me to mention: As of 1 January, for example, Austria introduced the visa requirement vis-a-vis Romania and Bulgaria.

It will be a temporary measure, it will have to be maintained or applied until steps are taken in other areas.

[Szombati] [indistinct interruption]

[Horn, continuing] It cannot be taken as definite—the experts are now working on the details, on the technical and other conditions. I should like us to be viewed with understanding on this, since the country's interest is paramount—we ourselves must protect our interests.

[Szombati] Mr. Prime Minister, a day scarcely passes without reports, speculation appearing in the press on further personnel changes. According to some information, you have not yet abandoned your earlier intention, or plan, to create the position of deputy prime minister for economic affairs. Is this true? Is this planned, and can further government personnel changes be expected, let us say in the autumn?

[Horn] I should like to point out that I am not planning any personnel changes. I sat down with Gabor Fodor, [minister of culture and education], and I told him that cooperation could carry on under set conditions, because I believe it is necessary for the work of the Ministry of Culture and Education to improve considerably. We discussed the related details, which Gabor Fodor accepted.

I have no intention of making any changes—the government functions as a good team, it is made up of excellent experts. I therefore, have no problem with this.

The problem lies in the need—in my view—for greater coordination, coordination of substance, primarily in the economic sphere, so that the proposals, drafts on which there has been consultation, do not become stuck at the level of the individual ministries. This is not the fault of the ministries concerned, but of the system of coordination and, unfortunately, the differences of interest, concept, are not lobbies, but ministries' interests that appear everywhere.

It is the coordination of these that I am thinking of when I say that it will be good to have a deputy prime minister for economic affairs, whose primary task will be this, and whose other task will be to bring together the various schemes, credit and financial schemes. Finally, the third will be to manage, direct the strategic tasks that emerge in connection with the European Union and which, as we proceed ahead, will be an ever increasing requirement.

It is not an idea, but a very carefully considered plan, and I intend to utilize the summer months to work out the details of it. If the parliamentary group and the Presidium of the Hungarian Socialist Party, and the coalition partner, are in agreement, then we will take the step.

[Szombati] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for the conversation.

On IMF's 'Unrealistic Demands'

LD0807195295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 8 Jul 95

[Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn by correspondent Zoltan Farka; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Farkas] You said not long ago that financial stability needs to be brought in line with society's degree of tolerance. Inflation must be reduced, the growth of Hungary's foreign debt must be stopped, and the budget deficit must be cut. Which task has higher priority now? [passage omitted]

[Horn] Look, all three things are closely related. [passage omitted] While we consider the further reduction of the budget deficit to be important, we also intend to fight inflation, create stability, and stop a further growth in the state's debt.

[Farkas] Does this run counter to what you told REUTER when you said quite decisively that Hungary does not wish to satisfy IMF demands, that the government does not wish to reduce the 1996 budget deficit to half the level of the 1995 budget deficit? After all, it is this target figure, by and large, which, if achieved, would mean that Hungary's foreign debt will have been halted.

[Horn] I wish I were quoted precisely. I did not say that we do not want to satisfy the IMF's wishes. What I did say was that we cannot satisfy unrealistic demands. The government has an interest in signing an agreement

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with the IMF, but, as I said, not at any cost. Neither the government nor I personally can undertake to cut the budget deficit by half within a year, for example. This would really exhaust society's level of tolerance and would create enormous social and economic tensions, which I find it inconceivable to accept. We do not want to break off contacts with the IMF; the negotiations are continuing. [passage omitted]

At the same time, I consider it very important that the IMF, or any other international financial institution, or any other Western partner of ours should take into account two things: one of these is that processes have started that are unusual even by the standards of some Western countries. The government, and through the government a number of social strata, has undertaken to implement changes which involve severe burdens. In other words, it is the tendency, the process itself, the endeavor itself that should be appreciated.

The other thing is this: People in the West, be it the EU or any other international organization, should formulate this twin demand regarding Hungary; that Hungary should advance with reforms while not spending more than it produces, but at the same time, it should also ensure political stability. [passage omitted]

Now when these two demands clash, not only we, but the international financial institutions, too, should should start thinking. [passage omitted]

Kovacs Says Romania Must Amend Education Act

LD0907130495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Canadian politicians support Hungary's membership in NATO. Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, who is visiting Canada, has been told this, among other things. Kovacs, who is to visit Romania in the second half of the month, was also told that Canada was satisfied with Hungary's foreign policy intentions. Gyoergyi Nemeth reports:

[Nemeth] According to the foreign minister, the new Romanian Education Act and the recent extreme anti-Hungarian manifestations did not create good conditions for signing the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty. Kovacs said that the Education Act was contrary to the European norms and the spirit of the treaty which is being prepared because the clauses of the treaty document will make the task of those endeavors more difficult which intend to restrict the opportunities of Romania's ethnic Hungarians. The minister said that Hungary would be able to sign the treaty only when its content also matched European expectations. He said that the text of the agreement could not contain less than the Hungarian-Slovak Treaty.

[Begin recording] [Kovacs] International treaties, international law take precedent over national legislation. Therefore, once the treaty is signed, then even the Romanian Constitution forbids the existence of national laws which contradict the the spirit and letter of the treaty.

[Nemeth] In other words, the Education Act must be amended.

[Kovacs] Yes. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Bokros's Severance Pay Analyzed, Criticized

95CH0283A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 10 Jun 95 pp 100, 105

[Unattributed article: "A High Stand; Severance Pay: Proper Tricks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Taking advantage of an opportunity provided by the law, Lajos Bokros, who traded his position as bank president with the finance minister's plush seat, accepted a 16 million forint [Ft] severance pay from Budapest Bank, Inc. The case which even led to a parliamentary debate before the agenda reveals that there are loopholes in the decree the Horn government passed last September against corporate severance pay of several (tens of) millions for former managers.

"Bokros was given Ft16 million by his bank," MAGYAR HIRLAP announced on 1 June, only one day after the deadline established by the government last September for the examination or perhaps modification of contracts with corporate managers which allow strikingly high severance pay. Because of the debate of severance pay in connection with the change of regime last summer (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 30 July 1994), executive decree No. 1084/1994 (15 September) of the Horn government ordered the government commissioner in charge of privatization and the ministers who exercise ownership rights to prevent the managers of firms which they—or rather, the then still separate institutions of the State Property Agency and the State Trustee, Inc.—hold from signing, so to speak, strikingly advantageous contracts with their employers.

The executive decree states that the basic rights of employers (hiring and termination of employment, development of regulations for salaries and severance pay) in these corporations should be assumed by the general assembly or membership meeting. The unspoken intention behind the executive order is to make sure that such decisions are not made by a narrow group of management, such as the board of directors, a body in which the chief executive (who in the case of a corporation is mostly a president-director general, that is to say, himself a member of the board of directors) has a greater

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chance of striking a bargain than at a general assembly at which in principle all the owners are present. However, in order to implement the executive order, general assemblies or general meetings had to be called, the constitution of corporations had to be modified, and thus, the government extended the deadline for the transition to 31 May. (A general assembly had to be held by this date in any case, because corporations must submit the financial statement approved at the meeting to the registry court by the end of May.)

The government expected the implementation of the decree to be drawn out, and requested the ministers and the government commissioner in charge of privatization to initiate internal regulations which allow for the review and perhaps modification of the contracts of managers of state-owned companies even before the statutes are modified. The cabinet's intent was to allow these managers to receive severance pay only in the amount and at the time the Code of Labor Law prescribes (although this law allows deviations from the Code in the contracts or collective agreements in favor of the employees both in terms of legal claims and of the amount). In terms of this decision, they prescribed the use of this "minimum rule" in the case of new contracts. However, knowing that the "severance pay," commonly known as lump sum settlement, is in a legal sense not severance pay, but rather wages due for the remaining time of the former contract because employment for a definite time was terminated early, the government prescribed that such contracts be converted into indefinite ones, unless "a law prescribes otherwise or other circumstances justify an agreement for a definite period of time."

As far as one can discern from the data which have been revealed, Lajos Bokros probably received his 16 million from the Budapest Bank, Inc. based on his appointment for a definite period of time which was terminated by mutual consent. According to the company law, the leading executives of business companies (in corporations, the members of the board of directors belong in this category) can only be elected for a limited time, no more than five years, and they can be recalled or can resign at any time. According to the Code of Labor Law, in a contract with a definite time period it is not possible to terminate employment by a so-called regular notice, in other words, the executive appointed for a definite period of time cannot tell his employer that he is resigning because, for instance, he found a better position. (In the case of employment contracts for an indefinite period of time this is possible, but in this case, according to the Code of Labor Law, the executive who is leaving of his own accord is not entitled to severance pay, only to a paid term of notice.)

According to the Code of Labor Law, employment for a definite term, except for probation, can be terminated only by mutual consent, or, if the employer wants to get rid of the executive very badly, by paying his salary in advance. Thus, the law does not consider who initiated an agreement which assumes the form of mutual consent, and it is not illegal for a prudent executive to stipulate in the contract in advance that even if they separate by mutual consent, he is entitled to money "for the lost years." According to labor law experts the companies agree to this stipulation because they like to prevent labor disputes with executives, and they rather pay discreetly and "buy" the silence of executives. (Apart from the absent final criminal sentence, this must be the explanation for the matching Ft16 million "severance pay" of Peter Kunos, director general of Agrobank, who was accused of bribery and was recently terminated.) As a consequence, labor law disputes with managers are very rare, and even if there are some—for instance, between the Gambling Corporation and its former manager, Lajos Posze, they took place almost exclusively because the state got involved somehow, most of the time as the owner.

Thus, Lajos Bokros presumably received his 16 million lawfully. At the same time it is striking, and this is at the basis of the ethical scruples, that the minister took the money in spite of the fact that he obviously did not have to leave the Budapest Bank because the bank wanted him to, but because the bank accepted with good will that the bank director would become minister, and even gave him provisions for the journey. (Which is, after all, understandable, because with the appointment Lajos Bokros, as minister, became the principal "owner" of the Budapest Bank.) Of course, the bank would not have been able to prevent the president-director general from leaving, but if it had employed the formula of extraordinary notice, equivalent to the old summary dismissal, the president-director general would have had to leave without the money.

The case becomes extraordinarily embarrassing for the government because all this happened precisely to the minister who proposed the package of laws about financial restrictions passed last week (which, for instance, plans to reduce the severance pay of public officials in certain cases). Lajos Bokros in his parliamentary speech reflected that "a welfare system has been created which is generous in comparison to the country's capabilities," which "has not been backed by business achievements," and that "a thorough reform of social services is unavoidable." (It is obviously not an accident that Tamas Suchmann, minister without portfolio in charge of privatization, listed his achievements as an employee in last Sunday's issue of NEPSZABADSAG, because last

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year he, too, left the Budapest Bank by mutual consent and with a "severance pay" in accordance with the bank's internal regulations.) Incidentally, although the severance pay is paid by the previous employer, it can be regarded as welfare, because for the months "paid" in this way one is not entitled to unemployment compensation.

The 16 million, regardless of whether it is coming from the bank, and not the coffers of the state or the social insurance, and whether the minister offers it, say, for the education of poor children, will certainly weaken Lajos Bokros's credibility, which was not supported by the fact that last year Budapest Bank received a Ft12 billion capital injection from the state based on a secret cabinet decree (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 13 May 1995). The government parties also feel this, legality notwithstanding; at least this was apparent in an interview with UJ MAGYARORSZAG on Friday in which Socialist Speaker of Parliament Zoltan Gal said that "this matter is politically very untimely, because it undermines the government's intentions and its credibility." Undoubtedly, it would be difficult to explain to the voters why Lajos Bokros who turned minister from bank director is entitled to "severance pay" when he was not discharged from his bank position against his will, while a regular employee is only entitled to severance pay amounting to a few months' salaries if he is fired or if his employer is closed down without a legal successor, but not if he changes positions of his own accord.

Official: No Revenue From Privatization Received

LD0707203495 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although the effect of the stabilization measures is already palpable, it is necessary to implement the draft supplementary budget as soon as possible, because the budget deficit has reached 192 billion forints [Ft] in the first half of the year, whereas the supplementary budget stipulates that the deficit for the whole year cannot exceed Ft156 billion. However, to meet this lower figure, privatization revenues of a considerable size should be obtained. All this was said by Laszlo Csaba, deputy state secretary at the Ministry of Finance.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] Csaba said that while revenues from customs had grown substantially throughout 1995, so far budget revenues from VAT and consumer taxes has decreased. No revenue for the budget has been raised from privatization in the first six months of the year.

[Begin Csaba recording] It must be realized, in any event, that the central budget has not received any privatization revenue. Out of the Ft150 billion, privatization revenue expected by the already adopted supplementary budget has not materialized in central budget revenues [sentence as heard]. [end recording]

[Correspondent] In the second half of the year financial experts want monthly privatization revenues of a size that will cover the budget's debt servicing obligations. [passage omitted]

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Izetbegovic Appeals to Clinton Over Srebrenica

LD0907190995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic has sent a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton in connection with the latest aggression perpetrated by Karadzic's Serbs against Srebrenica. In the letter President Izetbegovic asks for urgent action by the United States, NATO, and the UN Security Council to save this protected zone.

The letter says: The crisis around Srebrenica, a region in eastern Bosnia which has been besieged since the beginning of the war, has been going on for quite some time now. UN Security Council resolutions 824 and 836 declared this region a UN-protected zone. In agreement with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], the region was demilitarized in 1993. Despite these facts, the town and its vicinity have been exposed to constant shelling. However, the Serb aggressor yesterday started an all-out artillery attack on this region. The few UNPROFOR members there are neither able nor willing to protect the town, and around 60,000 citizens, including a large number of women, children, and the elderly, are threatened with extermination.

Please use your influence so that the international community will fulfill its obligations toward this UN-protected zone and prevent terrorism and genocide against the civilian population of Srebrenica.

In anticipation of your swift action. Yours sincerely, Alija Izetbegovic.

Letters of similar content have been sent to Chancellor Kohl, French President Chirac, and British Prime Minister John Major.

Briefs Rafsanjani, Demirel

LD0907173595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, spoke on the telephone to Turkish President Suleyman Demirel and Iranian President Rafsanjani today.

President Izetbegovic informed the two presidents about the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the difficult situation in Srebrenica, which is under UN protection, but is the target of extremely ferocious attacks by the Serb aggressor. He laid special emphasis on the fact that in this town there was a large number of refugees from eastern Bosnia, who had found refuge there from the onslaughts of the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor. When the area was being demilitarized, the defenders of Srebrenica had handed over their arms to UN forces who then took on the responsibility of protecting them. The town's Muslim population is now in great jeopardy.

President Rafsanjani expressed his readiness to help in every way in resolving the crisis in that town and reiterated his solidarity with the government and people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UNPROFOR's Behavior 'Cowardly'

LD0907151395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's expanded session of the executive committee of the Party of Democratic Action, devoted to the party's fifth founding anniversary, began with very bad news from Srebrenica.

Informing the members of the top party leadership about the latest Chetnik attacks on this protected zone, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and party chairman, said that the situation in Srebrenica is extremely difficult. According to reports by the Srebrenica municipal authorities, the aggressor is mercilessly shelling the very center of the town, where UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] members are in a panic and abandoning their positions. Some 40,000 people are being directly targeted by Chetnik artillery; the casualty figures are very high, although it is difficult to establish their exact number at this moment. By its disgaceful and cowardly behavior, UNPROFOR has enabled the aggressor to move closer to the very center of the town. If the Chetniks take Srebrenica the civilian population will face massacre and genocide. The Srebrenica municipal authorities have demanded that the government react swiftly in order to avert a massacre of the unarmed population.

President Izetbegovic informed the top party leadership about the state leadership's activities aimed at preventing a massacre in Srebrenica. According to him, all world centers of political power have been notified, as well as all friendly countries, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, and the command of the peacekeeping forces for former Yugoslavia.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will also do everything it can to frustrate the aggressor's genocidal intentions. [passage omitted]

Presidency Issues Statement on Srebrenica

LD0907100695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Just before we came on the air, the following statement on the difficult situation in

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Srebrenica was forwarded to us from the office of the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina:

In the light of reports of heavy artillery and infantry attacks on the protected zone of Srebrenica, President Izetbegovic spoke to Osman (?Suljic), president of the Srebrenica municipality, on several occasions overnight and this morning. Links with Srebrenica are via radio since the aggressor has isolated the area by cutting telephone lines.

Attacks were stepped up overnight on the urban areas of the town with the population of about 60,000, with a considerable number of them refugees and displaced persons. Having fired over 1,000 shells, the aggressor launched fierce infantry attacks. It is a well-known fact that Srebrenica is a demilitarized zone under the protection of the UN forces. Yesterday the Serb aggressor killed one of the Dutch soldiers serving with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], while the others were either captured or prevented from executing their duties in some other way. NATO has still not responded to the Dutch battalion's request for air support. The population of Srebrenica is resisting the aggressor by means available to it.

President Izetbegovic, who is regularly receiving detailed reports of the situation in the town, has instructed our Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic to call for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and to inform the following about the situation in Srebrenica: the White House, the State Department, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, Generals Janvier and Smith, as officers of the international forces directly responsible for the security of Srebrenica, and other international players.

President Izetbegovic has conducted a number of telephone conversations with several heads of friendly countries to inform them about the situation in Srebrenica. At the same time, the president had talks with our diplomatic missions abroad. Our diplomatic and consular missions in the countries with which we enjoy diplomatic relations have been instructed urgently to distribute the information about the crime committed against Srebrenica which assumed dramatic proportions overnight. Contacts are underway between Ambassador Sacirbegovic and ambassadors of the UN Security Council member countries and Dutch officials whose soldiers with UNPROFOR have a difficult task of protecting this demilitarized zone, said the statement issued by the office of the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Silajdzic Urges NATO Intervention in Srebrenica

LD0907141995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received the following news. In reaction to the all-out assault by the [Bosnian] Serb aggressor against the protected and demilitarized zone of Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Willy Claes. The message says:

An all-out attack by the Serb aggressor against the protected and demilitarized zone of Srebrenica is under way. Some 60,000 unarmed civilians are exposed to direct heavy artillery, tank, and infantry fire. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] forces, which ought to be protecting Srebrenica, are themselves at the mercy of the Serbs. UNPROFOR units in Srebrenica are in disarray, unable to defend themselves and the helpless civilians. Today in Srebrenica nobody can any longer even count the dead and wounded women and children who had been under UN protection.

I am convinced that NATO is already in possession of data on the situation in Srebrenica. During our recent meeting you gave me firm assaurances that NATO would intervene in case UNPROFOR and civilians came under attack, on the condition that this was requested by the United Nations. A direct attack is under way against the demilitarized zone and the UNPROFOR forces protecting it. I would appreciate it if you could inform me immediately whether the United Nations has requested NATO intervention, and, if so, why NATO has not reacted so far. Could it be that high-ranking UN officials are deliberately obstructing UNPROFOR's mandate, or is this an alteration of NATO's decision on Bosnia-Herzegovina, says Prime Minister Silajdzic in his message.

Seeks OIC Meeting

LD0907163395 Tehran IRNA in English 1615 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 9, IRNA—Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic, in a meeting here today with the Iranian ambassador to Sarajevo, Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, called for an emergency meeting of the contact group of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) for studying the critical situation in his aggressed homeland.

Silajdzic called on islamic countries to exert pressure on the Serbs through the OIC for halting the Serb aggression and making them accept inernational resolutions.

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Taherian for his part voiced Iran's support for the Bosnian people and their stance, and underlined Iran's attempts for solving Bosnia's crisis.

Details Special Measures

LD0907170595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, the Bosnian Government held an extraordinary session devoted to the dramatic situation in Srebrenica. The session was chaired by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. Damir Huseinovic reports:

[Huseinovic] In defiance of UN resolutions Bosnian Serb aggressor forces have pierced the lines in the southern part of the Srebrenica enclave, thus attacking unarmed civilians. Prime Minister Silajdzic underlined the full gravity of the situation and stressed that 4,000 civilians from Slapovic, south of Srebrenica, in the demilitarized zone, were under constant artillery fire and were forced to move towards Srebrenica. A large number of civilians are on the streets of this town, which is being shelled constantly, so there are many dead and wounded. It is still impossible to establish radio contact with Srebrenica, which renders the exact number of casualties impossible to determine. On this occasion aggressor soldiers abducted 15 UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] members, while responsible circles in this organization believe that their soldiers have guest status for the time being, so they are still not calling for NATO intervention. [passage omitted]

During the session, the government decided that if the attacks on the demilitarized zone continued and the United Nations and NATO failed to respond adequately, the following measures, proposed by Prime Minister Silajdzic, would be taken:

[Begin Silajdzic recording] The conclusion at today's session was that if the attacks on the demilitarized zone, that is, the population of Srebrenica, continued without a reaction on the part of the United Nations and NATO, we should reexamine the purposefulness of UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia.

Second, calling volunteers to come to Bosnia to defend it from fascism—as was the case in Spain for example—ought to be considered.

Further, the delivering of a demand to all friendly countries to send their troops and weapons should also be considered. In this instance, this would be an official demand to them to send their troops and weapons for the legitimate defense of Bosnia, in accordance with the UN charter. We have the right to do that, they also have the right to do that; UN members, in line with the UN charter, have the right to come to the aid of Bosnia either collectively or individually. We have not made such a demand until now, but now we need to consider also that possibility.

Fourth, we have decided to call on General Smith to return to Bosnia, to visit Srebrenica and assume his responsibility.

Fifth, if the same situation continues, without a reaction from the United Nations in particular—we have heard nothing from the United Nations about the attack on civilians, it seems that even some reports [words indistinct]—in that case we shall consider making public the names of those UN officials who we believe are abetting the aggressor in Bosnia, are abetting the aggressor in perpetrating the genocide against Bosnia and our people, and are obstructing the victim. [end recording]

[Huseinovic] About the fact that their inaction amounts not only to neutrality but their being an accomplice to the aggression, Silajdzic said:

[Begin recording] If those who are capable of doing something are reluctant to do it, we should have the arms embargo lifted so that we should be able to do it ourselves. If they will not do that, then we shall consider them as being an accomplice to the crime. Their people should be told so. Their nations should be told this every day until they realize that their governments must do what the United Nations Charter says, or lift the arms embargo and allow us to defend ourselves. [end recording]

[Huseinovic] The latest report on the exacerbation of the situation in Srebrenica has resulted in the postponement of the government's regular session. Consultations are under way on the measures that the government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will take in order to protect the unarmed civilian population of Srebrenica.

Cites Srebrenica Mayor

LD0907175395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After today's session of the government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic managed to establish contact with Osman Suljic, chairman of the transitional municipal committee of Srebrenica. Here is what Prime Minister Silajdzic told Bosnia-Herzegovina radio after the conversation.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] I spoke to Osman Suljic, head of Srebrenica municipality. He said that the

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situation was very difficult, that the town center was being attacked with four tanks, that 4,000 people had left Slapovici, that they were now in Srebrenica, and that the humanitarian situation was also extremely difficult. In response to my question about what the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] is doing, he said that UNPROFOR's command is underground, that there is no contact with them, but that this UNPROFOR command—I am obliged to convey what Mr. Suljic said—that UNPROFOR's command is passing on false information about what is happening there. That was what I managed to hear, the line was very bad. [end recording]

Akashi Said To Want 'Complete Control' of RRF

AU0707144095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The UN Headquarters in Zagreb announced that Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of the UN secretary general, will visit Geneva tomorrow. There he will meet with UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali with whom he will discuss the last details of the international Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] mission.

As the Zagreb command of UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation] claims, the two UN officials will also discuss the situation in Croatia.

We have learned unofficially in the diplomatic circles that Akashi wants to have a complete control over RRF troops and is threatening to resign unless this condition is met.

AFP Describes Reaction Force Units, Locations

AU0907135995 Paris AFP in English 2324 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 9 (AFP)—The multinational Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] will in theory be operational by mid July and will be made up of two elements: one called Alpha manned mainly by British soldiers, the other called Bravo made up of French troops. The RRF, whose mission is to reinforce the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia, will comprise the 4,450 British and French troops already in Bosnia plus another 4,700 British soldiers due to arrive shortly. A further 4,000 French soldiers will remain in France as reserves.

The troops already in Bosnia are equipped with artillery, armoured vehicles and helicopters. The 2,450 British troops in Bosnia are based in the Gornji Vakuf region of central Bosnia near the towns of Bugojno, Vitez, and Gornji Vakuf. Most of the men are from UN contingents already deployed in Bosnia.

The French contingent of 2,000 men includes 1,650 legionnaires who arrived at the beginning of June and are deployed about 20 kilometres (12 miles) south of Tomislavgrad in southern Herzegovina. The rest of the French contingent is made up of 190 airman based in the Croatian port of Ploce and 160 soldiers responsible for communications and logistics, some of whom are quartered in Split and some in Ploce. A French medical unit is also established in Split.

Also as part of the RRF, 40 New Zealand soldiers are based at Santici in central Bosnia and 180 Dutch soldiers are expected to arrive on July 11 to join the French forces.

The chain of command of the RRF will be integrated with that of the UN forces, meaning that it will be under the responsibility of British General Rupert Smith in Sarajevo and French General Bernard Janvier in Zagreb. The two will also confer with UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi. The RRF's headquarters have been established in Tomislavgrad.

The British airborne 24th brigade of 4,700 soldiers which is due to arrive shortly will be stationed in Split or Ploce. However it has not yet been given permission by the Croatian authorities to land in Croatia because of "diplomatic disagreement" over the nature of the RRF's mission.

Germany has decided to participate in the RRF by providing air support from bases in Italy and Germany and with a field hospital installed in Split. The German plan will involve at least 1,500 men from the three arms.

French RRF Group Viewed

BR0707141095 Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Jul 95 p 2

[Report by Jacques Isnard: "French RRF Group Is Ready To Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some 2,000 French soldiers from the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF]—the contingent promised during the NATO meeting in Paris on 3 June—are camping on the Tomislavgrad plateau in southern Bosnia. At 150 km from Sarajevo they are ready to go with their AMX-10 RC armored vehicles. Logistical elements and a detachment of helicopters are still in Ploce (Croatia). However, they both can benefit from advance bases to back up the progression of the rest of the RRF as the British and Netherlands elements are deployed.

For the time being Great Britain has sent a precursor detachment (around 900 men) to the same region, while awaiting a complement of Blue Helmets stationed in

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the Vitez sector. This complement will move when the new British Government, which has just been formed, has decided to allocate it to the RRF. In overall terms, the British contribution will be comparable to France's. The Netherlands has committed itself to providing a company of 170 men, with mortars, who will be taken from their contingent of peacekeeping soldiers in Srebrenica and allocated to the RRF.

If we are to believe the French military staffs, it will be on 10 or 11 July that the transfer of authority will be made, in other words the operation that consists of placing this multinational brigade under the orders of its appointed commander, French General Andre Soubirou.

Once this transfer of authority has taken place, the brigade, which constitutes the hard core of the RRF, will probably not be complete. Furthermore, it will not have access to all its reserves. Thus, the British 24th airborne brigade (4,000 men) is still on the way: Its precursor elements recently arrived in Split and it is having difficulties with transport—the Americans have offered to transport it—and problems in talks with the Croats. Similarly, the French force of 4,000 men, dubbed Balbuzard and kept in reserve with a view to evenly matching the British 24th airborne, is currently being put together in national camps. Roll-on roll-off ships will have to be chartered, or even requisitioned, to transport it.

Certain technical aspects of the mission given to the RRF still have to be finalized, beginning with the cumbersomeness of liaison with the United Nations and the need to agree on the same rules of engagement with the British. The staffs in both armies are working on this, since they are more than just minor details. In particular, it must be planned just how General Bernard Janvier, head of the UN Protection Force, can delegate to General Soubirou his responsibility of obtaining from NATO close air support for the RRF once it has been deployed, depending on the circumstances and the needs on the ground. Close support, as distinct from air strikes, is a way for ground troops that do not have heavy artillery to be protected and perhaps saved by aircraft.

The RRF is going to encounter a situation on the ground that is no longer what it was when the RRF was created in June. The Bosnian troops have not managed to create the rupture effect in the Sarajevo sector that they had hoped for with their offensive and are giving the impression of standing around. As for the Serbs, their superior firepower is still an undeniable advantage. They are benefitting from Belgrade's help. Thus, the Anglo-Saxons intelligence services say they are convinced that the shooting down of the U.S. F-16, whose pilot was rescued, shows that there is long-distance coordination from Belgrade of the antiair defenses used by the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs' problem would appear to lie more in holding onto the vast territory they have conquered.

This is this backdrop against which the RRF is being deployed. Its first mission will probably be to resupply Sarajevo. This will entail "securing" the Igman landing strip while, at the same time, avoiding having the RRF run any excessive risks that might be felt unacceptable by the French and British Governments.

UN: Aid Operation 'Paralyzed' Nationwide

AU0707171395 Paris AFP in English 1643 GMT 7 Jul 95

[Report by Francoise Michel]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, July 7 (AFP)—Bosnians could be facing widespread starvation with the virtual end of UN effort to break the Serb stranglehold on government enclaves, aid officials warned after the first confirmed deaths from hunger. For the first time since it began in mid-1992, the world's humanitarian aid operation across Bosnia-Herzegovina has been almost completely paralysed, officials of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said here.

In Bihac, a government-controlled northwestern enclave surrounded by allied Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces, UNHCR officials last week announced the first deaths—an old man and a three-and-a-half year old child—caused in Bosnia by starvation. A few days later, Bosnian Government officials in the besieged enclave of Srebrenica, close to Serbia in eastern Bosnia, said that malnutrition killed 13 in recent days because of a lack of food getting into the hilly enclave.

Since March, Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces have refused to allow all but a few humanitarian convoys across their lines into Bihac and have since turned the screws on the other Bosnian enclaves, notably Sarajevo, firing on convoys and in April shutting down Sarajevo airport. "We distributed 7,000 tonnes of aid in June but we assess need at 22,000 tonnes. It's our lowest figure this year," UNHCR Zagreb spokesman Gonzalo Vargas Llosa said, adding that the figure is expected to drop still further in July.

The whole UN military operation in Bosnia is supposed to be hinged on delivering aid to the beleaguered populations. Western officials regularly cite the importance of such deliveries as the reason for refusing to lift the UN arms embargo on the country and pull out.

After the UN ordered airstrikes against the Serbs on May 25 and 26, and the Serbs neutralized the UN

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force by seizing hundreds of its personnel hostage, relations between all sides have steadily worsened. The humanitarian crisis caused by the refusal to allow free passage to convoys affects all areas of Bosnia but is particlarly severe in the isolated government enclaves of Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, Bihac in the north and in Sarajevo. Around 60,000 people live under threat of starvation in Gorazde, 150,000 in Bihac and 300,000 in Sarajevo. The populations of Srebrenica and Zepa are much smaller.

The recent deaths "are symptomatic of the overall situation," officials at the UNHCR said Friday. "The situation is particuliarly bad in the eastern enclaves where we have never been able to keep a kind of reserve." In Bihac, aid officials have got in just 10 percent of necessary stocks in the past year, besieging Serb forces refusing all appeals to allow almost any convoys through. Serb officials Thursday allowed the first convoy in six weeks into Gorazde. In June the UNHCR delivered just 230 tonnes of aid against 700 judged the bare minimum to avoid starvation.

The Serbs have meanwhile been putting the squeeze on the aid agencies, demanding that they be given 50 percent of all foodstuffs and medicines taken into Sarajevo by the UNHCR across Serb land. So far the UNHCR has refused.

In Bihac, the public health situation is deteriorating and cases of hepatitis have become increasingly common, said Amanda Williamson of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Officials are particularly concerned about the coming winter, especially if aid organisations are not allowed to deliver fuel. "You could be looking at a large scale disaster," the ICRC's Sean Deely said.

UN officials still seem however to be reluctant to consider any use of force—as authorised under UN mandates—to break through the rebel Serb blockades and take aid through to the needy.

Asked what the aid officials would do if Serbs maintained their strangleholds on civilian populations, Vargas Llosa shrugged off the problem. "You cannot get regular access by force, we never used force to get our food into the enclaves," he said. "You have to go to war if you decide to use force."

Srebrenica Situation 'Critical'

LD0807144495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The humanitarian situation in Srebrenica is critical. Three more people died of starvation this morning. Here is another report from our correspondent in Srebrenica about the critical situation there.

[Reporter] Due to increasing numbers of wounded and dead civilians, resulting from the constant Chetnik shelling of the town and the outlying area, it is very difficult to transport the wounded to hospital. The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] was expected to come out and (?help) the people of Srebrenica and use their vehicles to transport the wounded to the Srebrenica hospital. However, UNPROFOR's vehicles in this protected zone have not moved for three days now. Even UNPROFOR soldiers at checkpoints have been cut off from their command for three days and have not even received any food.

The humanitarian situation in this besieged town is tragic. Three people died of starvation this morning. No UNHCR convoys will be allowed into the area by Karadzic's Serbs until further notice.

The situation in Srebrenica hospital is also very difficult. Seriously wounded people are constantly arriving, while the hospital is running out of basic medication. [passage omitted]

Aid Deliveries Contradict 'Muslim Media' Claims

LD0807205895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1948 GMT 8 Jul 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 8 (TANJUG)—The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) delivered 190.58 tonnes of aid to Muslim towns in Bosnia via Bosnian Serb territory in the first week of June. This fully disproves allegations made in the Muslim media that Bosnian Serbs are blocking humanitarian aid deliveries, the Bosnian Serb state news agency SRNA said on Saturday.

SRNA said the campaign launched in the Muslim media recently to prove that civilians in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac were starving was not designed to improve the humanitarian situation but the local Muslim forces' military and strategic position.

This is particularly true in the case of Sarajevo, where the supposedly "hungry and exhausted" Muslims, with tacit U.S. and German support and under the pretext of deblocking the city for relief supplies, mounted an all-out offensive on June 15. The offensive against Bosnian Serb positions and civilian targets has been raging unabated for 22 days, SRNA said.

SRNA said that, obviously unable to capture the Serb parts of Sarajevo with artillery and infantry attacks, the Muslims had turned to a media demonisation of the

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Serbs in an effort to move the Rapid Reaction Force to a "humanitarian deblocking" of the city.

Considerable quantities of supplies, provided by numerous international nongovernmental relief agencies, are reaching the Muslim part of Sarajevo daily from Mt. Igman through a tunnel dug under the airport, SRNA said.

That the quantity of food reaching the Muslim part of Sarajevo in this way is large is evident from the fact that more than 50 such agencies, mostly Islamic, are operating in Sarajevo, SRNA said.

It added that humanitarian deliveries were reaching the Muslim town of Bihac, a UN-designated "safe haven," via Croatia and West Bosnia which was under the control of Muslim forces fighting against the central Muslim government in Sarajevo.

SRNA said that in February 1995, when a crisis in Croat-Muslim relations had completely choked off aid deliveries, the Bosnian Serb side had offered that aid be transported via its territory, but international relief agencies had never responded to the offer.

The news agency said that, since the outbreak of the Bosnian crisis, relief agencies' deliveries to the Muslims via Serb territory had far exceeded those to the Bosnian Serbs.

SRNA quoted Bosnian Serb refugee and relief aid commission figures to show that in the first half of 1995, the Muslims received 69 percent of aid sent by the UNHCR and other relief agencies via Bosnian Serb territory, as against the Serbs' 31 percent.

In the first quarter of 1993, Muslims in Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica received 89 percent of all aid deliveries, and the Bosnian Serb Republic, barely 11 percent, SRNA said. In the first three months of 1994, the Muslims in those areas received 70 percent of the total aid deliveries, SRNA said.

Zubak Comments on Army-HVO Cooperation

LD0707214795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The blockade of Sarajevo will be lifted by a joint action of the Croatian Defense Concil [HVO] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, with a remark that this is not a job that can be done in one day. The blockade of the town must be lifted by military means because of the serious humanitarian situation and also because of UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] inefficiency in implementing the UN resolutions, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, said in an interview for the B-H press news agency.

Federation President Zubak assessed the cooperation of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a good way of organizing the army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Zubak deemed the latest proposals of Christian Schwartz-Schilling, mediator for the establishment of the Federation, on ways of overcoming obstacles in the establishment of the transitional municipal bodies, as unacceptable. According to him, the Croat partners in the Federation cannot accept the proposal of Schwartz-Schilling that a chairman of a transitional municipal council must be from a different nation and a different party than the nation and the party to which the municipal head belongs. This is how previous documents regulated the issue. The municipal authorities are established on the basis of the results of the elections and ethnic representation is not a criterion for selection, like in the election of the representatives in the cantonal assemblies. I could not accept any initiative that actually changes the Constitution of the Federation, Zubak said. The first man of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation declined to unveil his proposals which he submitted to mediator Schwartz-Schilling.

Commenting on the remark that the deadlines set by the Bonn treaty proved to be too short, President of the Federation Kresimir Zubak emphasized that these deadlines should not be extended anymore. Immediately after the signing of the Bonn Treaty, I voiced my doubts as regards the feasibility of realization of the objectives and the agreed tasks under the set deadlines. We signed the mentioned treaty under the pressure of the international factors which did not base their optimism on the realistic situation on the ground. I would even say that they underestimated problems which we face on a daily basis, Zubak stressed. [passage omitted]

The arrival of the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is regarded by Zubak as not clearly defined, because neither is their mandate clear nor who will command these forces. It is certain that their task is not aimed at the abatement of clashes and tensions, but we suppose that it is to protect themselves, Zubak said. Deployment of the RRF troops, according to him, points to justified indications that other interests and aims of their arrival than those officially proclaimed might be involved.

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Army: Serbs Receiving FRY Helicopter Support

AU0707144395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jul 95

[Statement by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units are successfully defending [words indistinct]. All aggressor attacks have been repelled and the aggressor has suffered significant losses in manpower. Karadzic's Chetniks have sustained the heaviest losses in offensives [words indistinct] in the region of [name indistinct] and (?Surduk), the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center has reported.

The enemy is increasingly using helicopters; helicopter support is being dispatched from the territory of Serbia and Montenegro and is bringing reinforcements in manpower and military hardware for Karadzic's Serbs.

The aggressor has continued [words indistinct] at civilian targets in Sarajevo and other free territories around Sarajevo, particularly Hrasnica, Visoko, Breza, and [name indistinct]. [passage indistinct]

Former General: Talks Led to U.S. Pilot's Rescue

AU1007105895 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 Jul 95 p 110

[Interview with Karl Gorinsek, "a Slovene-born former colonel of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, who graduated from the Belgrade military academy in the same year as General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serbs, and as the Belgrade chief of staff Momcilo Perisic," by an unidentified correspondent in Zagreb; date not given: "The Americans Love Spectacles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Was the recovery of U.S. pilot Scott O'Grady preceded by secret talks?

[Gorinsek] Yes. An agreement was indeed reached between the special U.S. envoy in Belgrade, Fraser, and President Milosevic.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you saying that the Serbs knew all along where O'Grady was and left his recovery to the United States?

[Gorinsek] No, I do not think so. But I know that the Americans contacted President Milosevic after they received the signals of their pilot and that Milosevic promised that the large-scale rescue operation will not be impeded.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why should Washington propose such a thing, and why should Belgrade agree?

[Gorinsek] By now, the Serbs have the strongest missile systems and the most modern antiaircraft systems in the region where the U.S. pilot was downed. In Banja Luka and Bihac, they have the Russian S-300 system, which is similar to the U.S. Patriot system. Thus, they can down U.S. aircraft even before they reach the mainland, coming from the Adriatic Sea. The U.S. helicopters would have been particularly easy targets.

[DER SPIEGEL] According to the U.S. version, two of the missiles fired from the Serbian positions only narrowly missed a helicopter during the rescue operation....

[Gorinsek] ...which I consider nonsense. The missiles would have hit the target if they had been fired.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you claiming that the whole rescue operation involving 40 fighter bombers and helicopters was only a show?

[Gorinsek] No, the Americans probably wanted to take precautionary measures in the event that the Serbs would not keep their promise. In any event, they love spectacles, and they want to demonstrate that they are the greatest.

[DER SPIEGEL] And Milosevic went along with that?

[Gorinsek] He could not afford the luxury of a confrontation with the United States. For one thing, because it threatened to destroy the radar installations of the Serbs , without which the Serbs would be virtually blind militarily. For another, Milosevic and his comrades expect the United States to continue its reserved policy on Bosnia, which is very much appreciated by the Serbs.

[DER SPIEGEL] What exactly do the Serbs expect?

[Gorinsek] That the United states continues its accommodation vis-a-vis Milosevic and, like in the past, it does not intervene on the Bosnian-Muslim side, and Washington leaves all difficult decisions to Europe.

Croat Official Views Role, Objectives of HDZ

AU0707164595 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 95 p 8

[Interview with Zdenko Cosic, head secretary of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Mario Marusic; place and date not given: "Protection of Croats as a Constituent People in Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some political circles were surprised with the appointment of Zdenko Cosic as head secretary of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while some others claim that it is (merely) a matter of "restoring the trust" in

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those who actually created the HDZ in these areas. Cosic believes, considering that he carried out duties in the party leadership throughout the past period, that he had never been denied the trust. Commenting on the possible background to Pero Markovic's departure and his own appointment to the position of head secretary of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he said:

[Cosic] We cannot discuss Pero Markovic leaving, since he remains a member of the Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a member of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and it is pointless to search for a background in my arrival to this position that would imply a political change and a change in the course of our party. The HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina has always had the goal of achieving recognition for the human and ethnic rights of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the constitution of the first multiparty Assembly to the solutions envisaged by the Washington Agreement, there was not one variant that would neglect the Croats as an undoubtedly constituent people in Bosnia-Herzegovina; it has not been and cannot be considered even in the heads and plans of those who would prefer not to have to look at us in these areas that have been ours for centuries. Regardless of certain personnel changes in the leadership of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, these will remain the main postulates in the search for the final solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We should not forget that we are at the stage of intensive constitution of the bodies of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, which also demands certain personnel adjustments. So this change of the head secretary can only be viewed within the context of general political events.

The Profiling of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Party

[Marusic] Apart from the change of the head secretary of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, some other changes were also announced: There was talk that even Dario Kordic, the number one man of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, may leave.

[Cosic] All the changes are in compliance with the earlier decisions of the Presidency of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding the need to reconstruct the Government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and they are the expression of our serious approach to bringing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the confederation with the Republic of Croatia to life. As far as I know, it is true that President Kordic is leaving, but only for a short while, to visit Croat emigrants. I see no reason for rumors, since Kordic was legally and legitimately elected as president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was precisely with his election that the party was for the first time organized in a statutory way, and, in the political sense, it took over the role that it was entitled to as the winning party.

This was not the case earlier. The party was, in a way, dormant and inactive, while individuals identified with the whole party, which, in some organizational aspects, did not even exist. Some newly founded parties, various associations, and groups tried to use that for their political promotion, ascribing the responsibility for all the trouble and dissatisfaction to the HDZ, while intending to take all the credit for its achievements. However, as the chances of them being part of the authorities became slimmer, so did the activities of those individuals and groups regarding the alleged protection of Croat interests.

The Protection of Croat Interests

[Marusic] There have been frequent appeals for unity within the HDZ. Are there opposing factions in the party, and is there anyone in the party who poses obstacles (and to what extent) to the implementation of the Washington Agreement?

[Cosic] The HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina often appeals for unity, and not without reason. However, these appeals are not appeals for unity within the HDZ, but for unity within the Croat body, that is, the unity that was proclaimed by President Tudjman's political concept on Croatian national reconciliation. There is no doubt that the Croatian state was created on the basis of that concept. However, the interests of the entire Croat people do not stop at the borders of the Republic of Croatia. It is equally important for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia to resolve and achieve the Croat ethnic interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We in the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina believe that the Washington Agreement is the framework that can satisfy our basic interests, and that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and its confederation with the Republic of Croatia represents a safe and permanent mechanism of protection of our interests.

Bearing in mind all the known and unknown obstacles that are already in the way of this project, Croat unity will certain be crucial here, which is one of the reasons we have been emphasizing it. In the flood of peace solutions for Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were some that were not satisfactory and even had a direct influence on the spreading of the military conflicts. There has not been one concept, as the Washington Agreement was, in which there was a consensus of the international community, and I can say that, within the HDZ of

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Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are no major individuals or groups that would oppose that concept.

Persisting in the Federal Concept

[Marusic] What are the relations between the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]? Has part of the SDA leadership, in the name of (con)federation, given up on "civil Bosnia?"

[Cosic] I am not sure that the support of "civil Bosnia" has ever been a strategic orientation of the SDA. After all, let us consider the genesis of the Croat-Muslim conflict in central Bosnia. That was a conflict of two concepts: With their political and armed struggle, the Croats demanded and supported the kind of organization of the state and legal system that would guarantee equality and complete human and ethnic rights (the struggle for one's own existence), while the Muslims demanded the living space that they had lost after the Serb aggression. This cannot be called a struggle for a civil state. The conquering of new territory at the expense of the "weaker one" in the conflict, creating an ethnically clean, one-ethnic territory de facto meant acknowledging the Serb aggression in eastern Bosnia.

The policy of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the closest to the principles of civil democracy, and the need for the protection and preservation of ethnic interests and rights was clearly emphasized. We could not and will not accept a civil concept that would only be a cover for various aspects of majorization.

Malicious Accusations Against Croat Leaders

[Marusic] What is happening with the implementation of the Mostar Agreement? It was precisely in Mostar that things got stuck.

[Cosic] Judging by the situation, there will be international arbitration in Mostar about the establishment of the transitory authorities. Personally, I think that this could have been avoided if the representatives of the two sides had reached an agreement at the level of the city of Mostar. The best thing would be to seek the solution in forming new municipalities in the city. Naturally, these would be no ethnic ghettos (as the Croat-controlled part of the city is now not one), but they would certainly be the condition for the survival of the city and the people in it. I think that this solution is acceptable to the European administration, too.

[Marusic] What is the position of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding the serious accusations arriving from Sarajevo about some leading officials of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina allegedly having committed war crimes?

[Cosic] Lately there have been attempts, through the writing of certain Bosniak, but also international papers, to put forward Dario Kordic's name in the context of the responsibility for events that are to have the weight of war crimes. I would like to point out that the writing of these reporters is completely unfounded and unjustified in connecting these with the operations of The Hague Tribunal, regardless of how serious the reporters are. I know for certain that, after one such newspaper article, Judge Goldstone himself distanced himself from these allegations, rejecting any possibility that the above mentioned article and he, that is, The Hague Tribunal, are in any way connected.

Croats Are Still Persecuted

[Marusic] The message that emerged from the Third Congress of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is "to us our own." How do we turn it into reality, with Croats still experiencing tragedies in Banja Luka and pressures in Sarajevo? They are not returning to Bugojno, Vares...?

[Cosic] There is no doubt that the Banja Luka area is the lowest point on the European ladder of human rights. Unfortunately, apart from making appeals to the international public and those who should do something in the name of the same ideals they hypocritically swear to, we are not able to help these suffering people in a more specific way. There are attempts to present persecutions, murders, and the destruction of Catholic churches and anything that is Croat as the consequence of the arrival of a large number of Serbs from western Slavonia following the limited-scope action by Croatian forces. However, the authorities there are only using it as a cover for the policy of genocide, since Croats were systematically expelled from the Banja Luka area through various forms of repression in the past, too.

We have no illusions, knowing that there are many open issues before us as obstacles to the final solution. As long as the local authorities in Bugojno resist the agreed upon and signed agreements, as long as pressures on the remaining Croats continue, as long as over 30,000 Bosniak refugees are living in Travnik, and mainly in Croat houses, there can be no return. This is why we are insisting on a consistent implementation of the Washington Agreement and on the forming of new municipalities, and are demanding that accommodation be found for the Bosniak refugees from the territories that are occupied by the Serbs in the cantons with a Bosniak majority, so that the ethnic picture in the mixed cantons remains the same. These are realistic demands, and the future of this entire project will certainly depend on them.

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Bosnian Croats View Muslim Military Cooperation

LD0707170395 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Journalists were today informed about the situation on the Sarajevo front and the participation of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] in lifting the blockade of the city at a news conference that was held in the newly founded press center in Kiseljak.

Answering journalists' questions were General Filip Filipovic, commander of the Combined Command of the Army of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Federation, Ignjac Kostroman, head of the Political Department of the Herzeg-Bosnia Defense Ministry, and Colonel (Mario Bradara), commander of the Kiseljak operational group. Here is a report by our correspondent:

[Correspondent] In his introduction, Ignjac Kostroman, head of the Political Department of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Defense Ministry, explained the general situation on all fronts, which, he said, was satisfactory. As regards the action to lift the blockade of Sarajevo, he stressed that this was not a Flash-like operation [May 1995 Operation Flash in which Croatia overran western Slavonia], and that this operation will last up to several months.

As regards further military operations, Major General Filip Filipovic said that one of the roads to Sarajevo will have to be opened, but the enemy should not be underestimated and all further operations should be realistic.

Colonel Mario Bradara stressed that over the past few days there had been a lull, but everything that had so far been planned had been realized, and more intense fighting was to be expected over the coming weeks.

Major General Filip Filipovic specified that the combined military operations of the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army were a new factor, and the aim of such military operations was to force the Serb aggressor to seek a political solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

SDS Reschedules Party Assembly for 21-22 Jul

LD0707195695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 7 Jul (SRNA)—The 25th session of the Serb Democratic Party of the Serb lands [SDS] Executive Committee was held in Pale today. The session discussed past and future activities regarding the next party assembly and its patron saint day celebrations, when the party's fifth anniversary will be marked.

Velibor Ostojic, chairman of the SDS Executive Committee, chaired the session. Chairmen of coordination committees for Birac, Romanija, Semberija, Herzegovina, Serb Sarajevo, and old Herzegovina took part in the session.

According to Ostojic, the Executive Committee decided to reschedule the party assembly, originally convened for 10 and 11 July, for 21 and 22 July, due to the declared state of war in the Sarajevo-Romanija area, due to the Muslim aggression against Serb Sarajevo, and due to the imminent threat of war in other areas of the Bosnian Serb Republic.

It was also concluded that a session of the SDS executive and main committees will be held before the assembly. The Executive Committee session will be held on 18 and 19 July and the main committee session will be held on 20 July. It was decided that all documents and all analyses regarding the SDS' past work will be prepared by then.

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic and SDS chairman, will present a report on the four years of party work with a special review of the political and military situation in the Bosnian Serb republic. [passage omitted]

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Tudjman's Aide Announces Talks With Serbs

BR0707141195 Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Jul 95 p 2

[Report on interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, head of cabinet for President Franjo Tudjman, by Yves Helier in Zagreb on 5 July: "Croatian Government Announces Renewed Talks With Krajina Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The noise of war has barely died down in Croatia and already negotiations are about to begin. In the midst of general pessimism, including on the part of the international negotiators, one man in particular wants to believe this. Hrvoje Sarinic, the head of cabinet for Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and one of his closest advisers, has even set a date for the beginning of dialogue with the Serbs who control some 20 percent of Croatian territory. He told LE MONDE on Wednesday 5 July: "I am convinced that talks will begin in one month's time."

Mr. Sarinic, who is responsible for contacts with the Serbs, has a number of reasons to feel optimistic. First, he explained, Carl Bildt, EU mediator for the Yugoslav conflict, contacted him on Tuesday [4 July] from Geneva to announce that the Serbian leaders in Knin (capital of the formerly Croatian breakaway region of Krajina) with whom Bildt had met the previous day had assured him that they "would agree to think about" the proposal for negotiations and that they would give their response in a week to 10 days. In any event, Mr. Sarinic considers that the conditions imposed publicly by the Krajina leadership for the start of negotiations was merely "gesturing intended for domestic Serbian consumption." Speaking on Monday [3 July] in Knin, the "president" of the "Serbian Republic of Krajina" Milan Martic stated at the news conference following his meeting with Mr. Bildt that the minimum condition for the start of dialogue with Zagreb was for the Croatian troops to pull out of the positions that they have recently seized in the west of Bosnia-Herzegovina along the Croatian border which threaten Knin, as well as from western Slavonia (in Croatia), an area recaptured from the Serbs at the start of May.

Mr. Sarinic stated moreover that the Croatian authorities had agreed to the first Serbo-Croat meeting being held in Geneva, with subsequent talks "in Croatia." He also said that Zagreb had placed just one condition on dialogue, namely that Milan Martic, considered by the Croatian Government to be a "war criminal" should not participate in the negotiations. As for the Croatian demands recently raised by President Tujdman concerning the reopening by the Serbs of an oil pipeline (from Rijeka to Sisak) and the railway (from Zagreb to Split) which both run through Serb-held territory, other Croatian Government sources claim that these are not conditions but "rules of the game" for the smooth running of negotiations.

Respite

Another thing that gives Hrovje Sarinic every reason to feel optimistic is the fact that "the key to the problem lies in Belgrade. Milosevic pulls the strings, but he will make a gesture before the strings break and will oblige the Krajina Serbs to enter into negotiations." The former Croatian premier has been in direct contact with the Serbian president since the outbreak of the war. In his opinion "Milosevic will very shortly make a statement to this effect." Finally, Mr. Sarinic notes that the situation on the ground has changed in recent months to the advantage of the Croats. He believes that recent Croatian military successes prove that "the Serbs are no longer as powerful (militarily) as they were before. This new situation illustrates the limitations of the Serbian forces. You have to be realistic and start to negotiate. For as long as the Serbs held the upper hand militarily then the negotiations were doomed to failure. Maybe the situation is different now...."

Aware that "the problem cannot be resolved in just one or two months," Mr. Sarinic said he was nevertheless eager to get to the negotiating table and to "get the ball rolling." The negotiating process should have started by the end of October at the very latest, when the current mandate of the UN troops in Croatia expires. The lack of any dialogue is more dangerous than a breakdown in talks, he explained, stressing: "We must tackle as fast as possible the heart of the issue: political negotiations."

Now that is where the real difficulties start, given the diametrically opposed positions of the Croats and the Krajina Serbian leaders. Even though the Croats are ready, according to Mr. Sarinic, to grant "a high level autonomy to the 11 municipalities" of the Glina and Knin districts, largely inhabited by the Serbs, without however granting "territorial continuity" between these two regions, the two parties have nevertheless totally opposite views on autonomy. For the Croats, "it is out of question to grant political autonomy" to the Serbs. As regards the Serbs' view on autonomy, those who do not request that Krajina be simply reattached to the other Serbian territories, "we call it independence," Mr. Sarinic says. Mr. Sarinic adds: "There is no question of giving Krajina its independence. There is no question of forming a Croatian federation let alone a confederation." "President" Milan Martic has long been in favor of secession for the regions under his control and their "union" with the areas held by their Serbian neighbors and brothers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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In other words, we are still a long way from arriving at a settlement for Croatia, even if Mr. Sarinic's optimism with regard to imminent talks has been borne out by the facts. It would appear that we are witnessing a respite since, if we are to believe Croatian Government sources, Zagreb has "frozen" all military operations until the end of October, a decision that would of course be revoked at the first sign of any "serious provocation" on the part of the Serbs. What then? The same sources maintain that everything will depend on the amount of progress that is made in the talks with the Serbs and the extent to which the United Nations applies its new mandate which provides for the posting of Blue Helmets along Croatia's international borders and not just along the front lines.

Istria Leader: We Want Regionalized Croatia

AU1007092295 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jul 95 p 5

[Interview with Ivan Jakovcic, president of the Istrain Democratic Congress, by Edi Jurkovic in Pazin; date not given: "We Will Fight to the End for the Autonomy of Istria!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Jakovcic has been president of Istrian Democratic Congress [IDS] for four years now, and after the party congress in Buje, where, in direct competition with the opposing candidate, Dino Debeljuh, he won the confidence of the great majority of party officials, he now has a new two-year mandate in front of him. It is, of course, reason enough to talk to him about the situation in the IDS and the policy of the party whose popularity in Istria is inversely proportional to its unpopularity in the rest of Croatia. The interview was granted in Pazin, immediately after the Assembly of Istrian County voted full confidence to Istrian county governor Luciano Delbianco.

[Jurkovic] What is your comment on the Istrian governor's decision to place his mandate at disposal of the councilors?

[Jakovcic] The point in question is simply an ethical move made by the governor, his personal request by which he wanted to check whether he really enjoyed the support of those who had elected him. For IDS it is a clear signal, aimed at those who dream of the violence over democracy in Croatia, that it is not something to play with. If there are new pressures on Istria, we will be forced to call upon people to say their word about all this. That is the minimum of our rights, because there is nothing else left to us. We will continue to appear in public in the legalist way in Croatian Parliament and elsewhere, conduct a coherent policy in the sense of creating a positive image of our state, to the contrary of those who have ruined the image of Croatia and who keep on going against Istria because their conscience is not clear.

[Jurkovic] Let us get back to the IDS election congress in Buje. The results and commentaries are already known. What is your opinion about it?

[Jakovcic] The congress took place in a relaxed atmosphere, but with the clear position that nobody can play with Istria, as some people have been trying to do for already five years and have been imposing something on the citizens of Istria that they do not want. It was apparent that IDS stands firmly behind its programmatic commitment, and that it stands firmly behind its legitimately elected key people. It is also apparent that all the speculations about the split between the moderates and the radicals, about the last congress attended by Mr. Debeljuh and Mrs. Bogliun-Debeljuh, missed their mark. All the speculations have dispersed, to the great disappointment of our opponents.

There Is No Split

[Jurkovic] It is, nevertheless, the fact that Dino Debeljuh was your presidential opposing candidate, and that Loredana Bogliun- Debeljuh publicly announced her withdrawal from the party.

[Jakovcic] Those statements were given in a heated atmosphere after great efforts invested in the organization of the World Istrian Congress and during the party election campaign.

[Jurkovic] Is this to be understood as a clear statement that everybody stays in the party and that all the misunderstandings have been overcome?

[Jakovcic] I have never believed that some of our prominent individuals would get out of IDS. Moreover, I want to say clearly and unambiguously that today many young people join IDS, and that is our strength. We do not need transfers of parliamentary representatives, transfers of political chameleons. We need unknown, young, expert people, who are the guarantee of our future.

[Jurkovic] Some of them, nevertheless, are leaving the IDS. Here, the last example was parliamentary representative Denis Jelenkovic who went over to the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community].

[Jakovcic] Unfortunately, parliamentary representatives in Croatia today are being purchased, which raises our price, but lowers the price of democracy. It is clear that one representative can mean a lot only for those who fear for their positions and are afraid of new elections. The loss of our three representatives, in this period since

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we have been in parliament, has passed painlessly for us, because IDS has lost no more members. We have dismissed two representatives, and one has been bought over. Their behavior later on shows their ethics.

[Jurkovic] Although the IDS congress has not brought any programmatic changes, I find the announcement of the party's activity spreading out of Istria very interesting. Concretely, you announced the founding of your clubs in Zagreb and Rijeka. What does that mean?

[Jakovcic] The matter that seems important to me is that our policy also becomes interesting to other citizens of Croatia, and our ambitions are precisely expressed in my speech at the congress, in which I, as one of the points, expressed the possibility of the IDS and its organizations appearing all over the territory of Croatia.

Our political concept, from the organization of a civilian and parliamentary state, in comparison to the superpresidential state today, as well as a clear concept of fighting for minority rights, freedom of media, and private ownership, leaning against the traditions of antifascist fighting, which we have already succeeded to implement in Istria, we want to implement elsewhere.

Historical Regions

[Jurkovic] Does that mean that you are giving up the cooperation with other regionalist parties gathered in ARSH [expansion unknown]?

[Jakovcic] No, IDS's first partner are those regional parties proper, and on condition that they accept the basic documents of ARSH. Our second vision is penetration into overall Croatian political space, and that vision is still not completely specified.

[Jurkovic] What will that mean in the context of the next elections? Will IDS go alone or will it enter a coalition with other parties on the elections? Recently you have talked about it with Budisa, the president of HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party].

[Jakovcic] The IDS is of interest to all political groups in Croatia, even the HDZ. Meanwhile, we will decide upon preelection cooperation with those political forces that support our ideas, and postelection cooperation to create a future Croatian Government is very important to us, because we want the IDS to participate in the government. Our objective is clear: enter the next government in order to make Croatia more democratic, and to do more for Istria.

We have talked to all the key opposition parties in Croatia: HNS [Croatian National Party], HND [Croatian Independent Democrats], HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], ASH [Action of Social Democrats of Croatia], and, of course, particularly, to regional parties. There is a general need for democratic change in Croatia, because I believe that four to five parties would manage to govern Croatia in a better way than the HDZ does today.

[Jurkovic] You have said that you would cooperate with those who support your ideas. It seems to me that the moot point in this is your consistent insisting on the autonomy of Istria. It was also repeated in Buje.

[Jakovcic] Our program is clear: We want a regionalized Croatia with its historical regions, experienced by the people as their own. Istria, Dalmatia, Slavonija, Lika, Gorski Kotar, Primorje, Zagorje, Medjimurje, all of these are familiar terms grown into people who identify themselves with them. Giving limited authorities to the counties that we have today means distrust toward people, and that logic according to which citizens know nothing, so one should make decisions in their name, is in fact anti-Croatian. Let me give you the answer to your question: we will enter a coalition with those who accept our vision of a regionalized Croatia. As regards the autonomy of Istria, we will fight to the end to achieve that, but only and exclusively using legal means.

Council for Istria

[Jurkovic] In all this, where is the one more programmatic objective of yours, which regularly raises a lot of dust, the one about transbordering [transgranicnost]?

[Jakovcic] I think that this myth is also being explained slowly. At the recent seminar organized by the Council of Europe and Istrian County in Brtonigla, everybody could have seen what it is really about, what is the meaning of Istria for Europe, but also how Istria brings Croatia closer to Europe and the current processes of integration.

I have just received a fax from the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They congratulate us on the organization of the seminar on transborder cooperation, and, let me quote it, "they are convinced that the knowledge acquired at the seminar, particularly the examples of European standards presented, and the expert explanations of Council of Europe specialists, as well as the useful direct exchange of opinions, would contribute to better mutual recognition of open questions and solving them together." You see that Istria is fully working on the Europization of Croatia.

[Jurkovic] The last question: I have to ask you what is your party's position on the presidential Council for Istria, regarding your harsh criticism toward this body expressed also on the congress in Buje?

[Jakovcic] The IDS will formally demand from the president of the republic that he reconsider his decision

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on forming the Council for Istria, because, on the one hand, people have not become accustomed to it and it has not been accepted, and on the other hand, it is far better for the president to seek advice from Istria in the existing county bodies.

[Box, p 5]

Greater Croatia

[Jurkovic] Your statement that Istria does not want to have anything to do with the creation of "Greater Croatia" has recently met with a harsh response by HDZ secretary general Zlatko Canjuga, who called it malicious and baseless, and added that you wanted to impute that Croatia carried out the same policy as the Greater Serbia one. Can you explain your position on this?

[Jakovcic] I can only repeat what I have already said, that breaking up Bosnia-Herzegovina and creating the concept of greater Croatia really is a mirror of Milosevic's fascist Serbian policy, and that such a concept is in no way acceptable to the IDS, and that in the case of the creation of confederate relation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the IDS wants to keep the right to change its political objectives, in the sense of different internal organization of the Republic of Croatia.

Daily Views German Decision To Send Troops

AU0707145195 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jul 95 p 1

[Commentary by Nenad Ivankovic: "The Lead Violin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A boxer that experiences a hard knock-out is often under a more difficult and long-lasting psychological shock than a physical one. The psychological consequences can lead to such a stressful condition that the boxer, though he has physically completely recovered, simply remains "blocked." The memory of the knock-out he experienced, as well as the fear of another one, most often result in the loss of confidence in his own powers. In the end, this leads to a change in his "style of fighting" or to his abandonment of the ring.

For a long time, this was precisely the kind of situation that Germany was in. In foreign politics (partly, of course, for objective reasons) it acted in such an "abstinent" way that it acquired an almost derogatory mark: an economic giant, but a political dwarf!

The (Friday) discussion in the Bundestag about the sending of the Tornados to Bosnia, as well as the rest of the military aid and support for the French-British Rapid Reaction Forces, showed clearly how deep is the German trauma about the lost war and all the horrors that the Germans experienced after May 1945.

On the other hand, the relatively wide parliamentary support for the government decision showed clearly that Germany, although still perhaps too cautiously, is returning to political-psychological normality. The mere fact that the government and the parliament managed to make the decision that, for the first time since World War II, German soldiers (with practically a combat task!) would be sent outside the NATO area, and to Bosnia at that, is almost comparable to the Copernican revolution. The leader of the Greens in the Bundestag, Joschka Fischer, was completely right in crying out, deeply unhappy about such a development, that, with this decision, Germany had definitely abandoned the former foreign political principles and orientation.

However, he, just like the Social Democratic leaders who, in their refusal to send the Tornados to Bosnia, referred to Brandt's principles, are not right in accusing the government of allegedly militarizing foreign policy, that is, in saying that the sending of the Tornados would lead to an escalation of the conflict in the Balkans.

Germany's military support for its Western partners in Bosnia, though undoubtedly historically significant, will hardly be more than symbolic for the development of the situation on the ground; not only because the mandate of the German forces is strictly limited and tied exclusively to the support of the Rapid Reaction Force, but also because the Rapid Reaction Force has such a mandate that only the politically naive can expect a serious change in the UN attitude in that country. This means that the chances of the German ECR-Tornados carrying out combat activities against the Serb antiaircraft missile bases are hardly greater than theoretical. The real scope of the government decision and its confirmation in the Bundestag lies in the psychological and political aspects, and, if you will, in the tactical one. In a wisely restrained way, it made use of the really favorable chance to break the stick over the knee. The situation in Bosnia is such that the German military engagement really presents itself, even to the most suspicious, as primarily support and help to the politically, and in a certain way militarily, groggy Paris and London, rather than as a hidden desire to act from a position of power.

The continuity of the foreign policy that may be described as "active pacifism" has thus, psychologically as well as realistically, been broken; "active pacifism" in fact meaning escape from responsibility for the mere fear that something wrong would (again) be done.

This cut certainly means that Germany has returned to the foreign political scene, with all its economic, political, cultural, and other weight; it was a completely

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conscious return. In prospect, this return means the end of the French Europe, so to speak, and the beginning of a Europe in which the new orchestra of powers will take care and make decisions regarding its future, an orchestra in which, by the mere logic of things, the role of the lead violin has been secured for Germany.

Bosnia shows that development in plain view. If Bonn had held to the position of active passivism, if it had not made the decision to send its troops, it would, politically speaking, have nothing to say either in Bosnia or in the former Yugoslavia. However, with the decision it did make, it has politically won Bosnia and, at the same time, taken over the responsibility for the development of the situation in that part of Europe. This is, in fact, the real meaning of the historical decision that the Bundestag made on Friday.

Paper Views Chirac's 'Action Plan' for Bosnia

AU0707161595 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jun 95 p 9

[Commentary by Ivkica Bacic: "A Plan for the Bosnians, a Dessert for the Europeans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Press correspondents have made a note of yet another spicy story: The European 15 were, for the first time, served a peach dessert in Cannes. The promotion of the dessert followed the compromise regarding the "chances of a strong Europe," as well as the promotion of yet another serious "action plan" to end the war in the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European planners are satisfied, and the chef (of the Martinez Hotel in Cannes) probably received some recognition too.

Everyone can take a break now, especially the French, since, at the end of their half-year term of chairing the European Union, they put together "something new" for the resolution of "the greatest European crisis." What was it that Chirac offered and the others accepted? First, there was the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo, then the starting of negotiations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the restoration of the dialogue between Croatia and the local Serbs, a four-month cessation of hostilities, and then the mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later the other successors of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The French president appealed to the Americans to back the plan "without reservation," and flattered the Russians by appealing to them to do the same, counting on them not having too much difficulty in getting the Serbs, "wherever they may be," to agree to the "details" of the plan. These Serbs therefore include those from Pale, recently visited by Churkin—we do not know in what capacity, but it was a public visit (as opposed to those of the French generals, who like perform their visits in secret)—who forgot that, until recently, he was saying: "I will never again be among the (Pale) Serbs."

Our optimists warmly welcomed the fact that Croatia was pushed "to the margins" in Cannes. To them, a "marginal" mention also means a "merely marginal" placement in the Yugoslav crisis. Their analogy does not sound too convincing, and, unfortunately, reality also denies the existence of its grounds. Croatia is, in Stoltenberg terms, "pro-Europe oriented," which is nice to hear from a (former?) peace mediator. However, Croatia is still "truncated," which is as important for Stoltenberg as the fact that not only Serbs live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He does not acknowledge that fact, and therefore "they are all Serbs," from which it follows that Croatia is "not truncated" either, since without the Krajina it suits Stoltenberg just fine.

The pessimists do not use analogies, but remind us that the Europeans have, for a while now, been "eschewing" Croatia in just about the same way that UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and his emissary, Akashi, have been eschewing the increasingly drastic military involvement of Belgrade in the war in Croatia. The new wave of mobilization for the Krajina has not subsided yet. During June, the Serbian president sent 4,000 (Croatian) Serbs, who were recruited by force, and about 2,000 volunteers to the occupied parts of Croatia, says the letter written by our chief of diplomacy, Granic, who pointed out to Butrus-Ghali that the issue is "direct military intervention" on the part of Milosevic's regime. Apart from sending high officers of his army for temporary work in the Krajina, Milosevic is still generously supplying the rebel Serbs with heavy weapons. By mid June, 28 tanks, 10 armored personnel carriers, and missile equipment for the Mi-8 had arrived in the Banovina area from Valjevo and Nis, says Hrvoje Sarinic in his letter to Akashi, who "had no idea" this was so.

It was because he "does not know" anything about the Serbian aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina either that Chirac was, in the jet-set Cannes, able to answer the question of how he was going to implement the "new" plan with such self-confidence. "With reinforced diplomacy," said Chirac seriously; perhaps since the entire world has come to realize that only "diplomacy" is acceptable to Milosevic. The three-year siege of Sarajevo will be dealt with in a similar way, with "reinforced diplomacy." As it has been proved, Karadzic also falls only for words, admittedly, somewhat harsher words, which means precisely Chirac's, who also stated the following in Cannes: "In order for people to listen to us, they also

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have to respect us, both in the diplomatic and the military sphere."

Militarily, the summit of Europe is "threatening"—whom?—to use the so-called Rapid Reaction Force, about which it is still not clear what they are going to do in Bosnia and where it is going to be, which is already contributing to the entire UN peace operation that appears like the theater of the absurd. Diplomatically, the 15 have entrusted Owen's successor, Carl Bildt, with everything. The latter not only does not share the optimism of the 15, but differs from his employers in some "details," too. "What is happening in Sarajevo is not war, but savagery. Europe has to bear that in mind," Bildt stated after he had visited Sarajevo.

Before dessert, Chirac proposed, and the others accepted, that "the blockade of Sarajevo be lifted and the humanitarian corridor be opened through diplomatic means, and then a not-negligible number of UN soldiers should protect the corridor." Before accepting the Cannes recommendations, Karadzic's Serbs are killing at a record rate, in the first three days of this week they killed 50 people in Sarajevo, mostly children. The number of persons killed did not escape the attention of the UN soldiers with binoculars.

Martic: Western Politicians 'Responsible'

AU1007121395 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1000 GMT 10 Jul 95

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Krajina Serb President Milan Martic by Karl Jekowski and Fritz Pesata in Knin; date not given; Martic statements in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed translation into German]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] In the blue room of the new presidential building in Knin, surrounded by modern furniture, Milan Martic, president of the Krajina Serbs, grants us an interview.

Among other things, he says that the Krajina Serbs have always displayed their good intentions to solve problems peacefully. Yet now, after the Croats reconquered western Slavonia, they no longer trust the Croats in the least. On four occasions, the Croats failed to keep promises and agreements toward the Krajina Serbs, Martic says. He adds that before the Krajina Serbs return to the negotiating table under the auspices of the United Nations and the EU, the Croats would have to withdraw from western Slavonia and the territory would have to be put under UN control again. Second, the Croatian Army must withdraw from Mt. Dinara near Knin.

Asked why the Krajina Serbs fired shells at Zagreb, the Krajina president said:

[Martic] First, I must say that, when we decided to shell Zagreb, we did not aim at the civilian population. We wanted to hit the Croatian military headquarters and other military facilities. That we hit civilian targets is the result of artillery faults, something nobody can absolutely rule out. Moreover, the shelling of Zagreb was also the response to the Croatian Army's bombing of a column of Serbian refugees from western Slavonia, which we could not accept.

[Correspondent] Milan Martic describes his relationship with Serbian President Milosevic as good. Relations with the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic, are also fine. Martic, however, stresses that none of the three politicians are very important. What matters are the Serbian people. The Krajina Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs have embarked on the path of unification, and nobody will stop them from doing so, Martic said. The Serbs have the right to be internationally recognized. We Serbs want to be one state on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Confronted with the statement that Croatian President Tudjman described him as a war criminal and asked whether he would say that Tudjman was a war criminal, too, Martic said:

[Martic] In my opinion, not only Tudjman is a war criminal. A large number of people are responsible for the destruction of Yugoslavia, notably international politicians such as Genscher, Kohl, Van Den Broek, Kinkel, they all are responsible for the current situation, Alois Mock, too. We have documents that prove that Alois Mock was paid by the Croats for his pro-Croatia policy.

[Correspondent] Regarding the role of the United Nations, the president of the Krajina Serbs argues that the United Nations has forfeited much trust from the Serbs. There is plenty of evidence that the United Nations has supported the enemies of the Serbs. The United Nations was favoring one side, and could only stay in Krajina if it acted in a neutral way, Martic said.

Asked how he evaluates Austria's foreign policy toward the Serbs, Martic said:

[Martic] Austria's foreign policy has been gradually changing since Alois Mock was replaced as foreign minister, and it is getting somewhat friendlier toward the Serbs.

Martic Opens New Telephone Exchange in Knin

LD0707162395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1506 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 7 Jul (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina, today

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opened a new, automatic, digital telephone exchange in Knin.

The new exchange will link six regional exchanges in northern Dalmatia and Lika and facilitate better connections between the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Bosnian Serb Republic, Yugoslavia, and the world.

The exchange's capacity is 1,200 lines—four times more than hitherto—and this will enable a further 480 telephone points to be installed locally.

Rajko Peric, director of the Krajina Post, Telegraph, and Telecommunications [PTT] enterprise, said that about 5.5 million dinars has been invested in the modernization of PTT communications over the past few years and of this sum 800,000 German marks have been invested in the new telephone exchange in Knin.

Eastern RSK Officials Protest to Knin

LD0807155195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1150 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vukovar, 8 Jul (TANJUG)—Two vice presidents [deputy speakers] of the assembly of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] and the presidents of four municipalities in the eastern part of the RSK have issued a statement voicing their serious objections to the proposed list of government members, the informal manner in which they learned about the candidates for ministerial posts, and the venue of the next assembly session. [passage omitted]

The signatories note that the number of ministries has been cut down and their competences have been altered, whereby the parallel structure between the RSK ministries and those in the Serbian Government has been destroyed, which causes unnecessary difficulties in cooperation between the ministries.

"The proposed allocation of the ministries and the top state posts is doing an even greater injustice to the eastern part of Krajina," the statement stresses and adds that not a single high-ranking state official or minister in charge of important ministries is from that part of the RSK.

"Almost all of them are from Knin, the town which accounts for only five percent of Krajina's total population. Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem account for 50 percent of its population, generate more than 80 percent of the domestic product, and even defend Krajina's western borders with the lives of its best sons. At the same time, only one-quarter of the people's deputies and one in six ministers come from this areas," the statement stresses.

The signatories are also against holding the session of the RSK Assembly to elect a new government in Mirkovci.

"Since there was a vote of no-confidence in the prime minister in Knin because of his opposition to the rash, one-sided decision on unification with the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and his calls for a policy of negotiation and peace, and since the government in Knin was brought down in these most critical times for the Republic of Serb Krajina in order to cover up the responsibility for the tragedy of the people of Western Slavonia, as well as because of his acceptance of the policy of the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia for Krajina, then let the attempt be made in Knin to elect the new government, which will implement the policy of the Knin political leadership inevitably leading to the separation of Krajina from the motherland," the statement says. [passage omitted]

The only just and honorable solution to our stalemate is to call early elections and form a nonparty government of experts, whose sole task will be toprepare fair, early elections, says the statement signed by Boro Bogunovic and Djordje Damjanovic, deputy speakers of the RSK Assembly; and Slobodan Milovac, Ilija Jaksic, Jovo Rebrac and Slavko Dokmanovic, respectively the presidents of the municipalities of Beli Manastir, Dalj, Tenja, and Vukovar.

Krajina Serb Gen Mrksic Fears New Action

AU0807202995 Paris AFP in English 1859 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Knin, Croatia, July 8 (AFP)—Separatist Serbs of the Krajina region of Croatia are building up their armed forces to defend themselves against a "new action by the Croatian Army," the head of the separatist forces General Mile Mrksic said Saturday [8 July].

"Croatia now has a respectable military capability and we must set up a solid military organisation capable of withstanding it," Mrksic said, as quoted by the separatist Serb news agency ISKRA.

Mrksic, until recently a member of the general staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces in Belgrade, implicitly confirmed reports of a forced mobilisation of Krajina Serbs who had sought refuge in the rump Yugoslavia formed by Serbia and Montenegro. The arrival of expatriates who had left Krajina "during and prior to the war" were now fighting in the Croatian Serb forces and "restoring confidence to the people and raising the army's morale," he said.

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Several thousand Croatian Serbs were reportedly rounded up within rump Yugoslavia and taken in buses to fight in the self-proclaimed Krajina republic. Mrksic added that "retired people, women and active invalids" were being asked to do obligatory work "because every inhabitant can contribute to the defence of the country when it is threatened with war."

Mrksic was named head of the separatist forces in Croatia last May, replacing General Milan Celeketic after the fall of the Serb-held region of western Slavonia, in the east of the republic, to the government army. Serb forces opposed to the central authorities in Zagreb currently hold around 20 percent of Croatian territory.

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Gligorov Requests UN Financial Aid for Region

AU0807140495 Skopje MIC in English 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Assistant UN Secretary General for Political Issues Alvaro de Sotto met with President Gligorov yesterday, as part of his two-day visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], AFP reports.

According to this agency, in the talks, President Gligorov underlined the losses suffered by Macedonia as a result of the sanctions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and stressed that the UN must help Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece financially, which are suffering because of the sanctions. He added that the sanctions were creating crisis regions in the Balkans. [passage omitted]

Border Police Seize Albanian Publications

AU0807155695 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 30 June, the FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] border police at Skopje Airport seized 50 copies of "Metalurgjia e Feronikelit" (Phero-Nickel Metallurgy), a scientific book by the Kosova Albanian author, Dr. Nagip Murati. Professor Murati told KIC [the Kosova Information Center] he was held at a police station near Skopje Airport for over four hours. The Macedonian police tried to force him to declare copies of the book were dedicated to the Tetovo University. Before he was released, Mr. Murati was told that the police would keep the books till he got back to Skopje. Upon his return on July 5th, Mr. Murati went back to the police station to pick up his books, but the police refused to give them back, saying the books were taken to the FYROM Interior Ministry for investigation. Mr. Murati was not told whether he would ever get his books back.

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Germany's Kohl Lays Wreath at Auschwitz

LD0807101295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1027 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Auschwitz, 8 Jul—On Saturday, the third and last day of his visit to Poland, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl laid a wreath at the "Wall of Death" on the terrain of the former Hitlerite concentration camp at Auschwitz.

Earlier, the German head of government entered the terrain of the camp through the gate over which there is carried the message "Arbeit macht frei" (which means "Works makes you free"). The same slogan greeted prisoners coming to Auschwitz during World War II.

The Chancellor and his wife Hannelore were accompanied by Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, a former prisoner of Auschwitz.

Addressing Kohl, Auschwitz museum director Jerzy Wroblewski said that he greeted him "as a pilgrim, who has come to Auschwitz to bow his head before the shades of the people murdered here." [passage omitted]

Kohl Meets Youth at Krakow University

LD0807164895 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 8 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, during a meeting with Polish and German youth at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow this afternoon, said the advantage to Germany of Poland's membership of the EU will be the deepening and consolidation of peace in Europe. He added that youth exchange is a factor strengthening the positive transformations in Europe.

Earlier, before the meeting began at the university's Collegium Novum, Chancellor Kohl stopped at a tablet commemorating the Sonderaktion—the imprisonment and murder of Jagiellonian University professors at the beginning of the Second World War.

Oleksy Announces Bonn-Warsaw 'Hotline'

LD0807191795 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy and Chancellor Helmut Kohl have decided to open a Warsaw-Bonn telephone hotline. Announcing this, Jozef Oleksy stressed that it was one of the more important decisions made during the German chancellor's visit to Poland. The Polish head of government recalled that a similar hotline was opened recently between him and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. In Jozef Oleksy's opinion, the fact that such a line will now link the Polish prime minister and the German chancellor shows the equilibrium of Polish foreign policy in the West and in the East.

Foreign Minister on Results of Kohl Visit

LD0807214495 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 8 Jul 95

[Comments by Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski on the results of the visit by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is perhaps too early to sum up in a politically more profound way, but the first impression and certain experiences while accompanying the chancellor during the whole of his stay, which was my privilege, allow me to already say that this was an important, substantial, good-neighborly visit, which aroused hope and confirmed our expectations, and that is enough. The historic breakthroughs have already been made; luckily we do not have to make them.

It is enough to be convinced that we are dealing with a reliable partner, a good neighbor, who wants to support us on our road to European integration, and sees the importance of this not only for us, but for himself too; for moral impulses are healthiest when they are linked to a well understood and objectively understood interest.

Defense Commission Head on Relations With Russia

WS0707143595 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 7 Jul 95 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the Polish Sejm National Defense Commission, by Wieslaw S. Debski; place and date not given: "We Do Not Talk With Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A group of Polish Sejm deputies visited Moscow recently. We conducted an interview with Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission, on this visit.*

[Debski] You were in Moscow at the invitation of the State Duma's Committee for Defense. With whom did you have a chance to speak?

[Szmajdzinski] We held a few meetings in the Duma; we met with, among others, the chairmen of two committees—defense and foreign affairs—as well as with the chairman of the "Yabloko" bloc. We also held a talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov.

[Debski] What can you say about Polish-Russian relations now that you have held those talks?

[Szmajdzinski] A lot has been done in economic issues, border area cooperation, and in issues related to our

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history and symbols; considerable progress has been made in these areas. However, there is almost no dialogue on issues of European security; no attempts are made to explain Polish and Russian arguments over this issue—even though it is obvious that there are fundamental differences between our conceptions of security.

If we happen to discuss these problems with the Russians, then it is only when Poles act as experts or as representatives of international organizations. Thus, we take the side of the North Atlantic Council, the United States, or France. Let me repeat once again that there is no Polish-Russian dialogue. A 45-minute talk between the foreign ministers, such as the one that was held in Gdansk, is not sufficient. There must also be permanent consultations among experts of various circles and representing the parliament, the Ministry of Defense, and the Foreign Ministry.

[Debski] What are the consequences of this?

[Szmajdzinski] Our arguments and our way of thinking do not get across. Hence this pretty general opinion that we want to unite with the West against Russia, that NATO expansion will pose a threat to Russia. We were asked, for example, why do you not want a Pan-European security system. We had to explain the basic principles of the Polish stance; we had to explain that we are not against such a system, but that we want to reach it by different means.

[Debski] What does this mean in practice?

[Szmajdzinski] It means, for instance, that both partners are poorly implementing the agreement on military cooperation, concluded by the defense ministries of both states. Our Sejm commission assesses that this agreement envisions various activities, but they are simply not being put into effect. There have been no contacts between the Defense Ministries of Poland and Russia for a year and a half now. This is abnormal.

For quite a long time now work has been under way on an agreement on cooperation in the area of special transactions; the work concerns, among other things, mutual supplies of spare parts. There is, however, considerable resistance on the part of Russia. One can come across fears, or at least doubts, whether it is worthwhile to deliver military equipment to a country whose policy—this is how they understand it—is directed against Russia.

Unless we explain our arguments, unless we present our understanding of the interests of Poland and of this part of Europe and of Europe as a whole, I do not think that it will be possible to make any progress in such areas as military cooperation or cooperation in the area of armament. This cooperation would certainly be in the interests of both sides.

There are also things that are important to us: Russia should explain its intentions when it speaks about the need to renegotiate the treaty on limiting the Armed Forces and conventional armament in Europe. This issue concerns us, and therefore, it must be discussed as well.

[Debski] You visited Moscow over a year ago as a member of a parliamentary delegation. What you have said so far seems to suggest that very little has changed in the way the stances are presented?

[Szmajdzinski] As I see it, little indeed. If there has been any progress, then it is in the dialogue among political groupings rather than between the governments. Due to the role which the parliament plays in Russia, there is not much in common between dialogue of parliamentarians and official state arguments.

For the time being, then, we are waiting for Minister Grachev and Minister Kozyrev. We extended an invitation from us to the Defense Committee. The thing is, however, that Russian parliamentary elections will be held soon, and in our country—presidential elections. Still, it is worthwhile to do everything possible to enter into a more comprehensive dialogue; this dialogue should be conducted especially between experts and officials of appropriate ministries.

Finance Minister on 1995/96 Budget

WS0607144995 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 6 Jul 95 p 8

[Article by Maciej Fischer: "The Deputy Prime Minister's Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After two pay raises projected for January and July, individual earnings in the public sector will grow on average by 145 zlotys [Z]. As Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko informed yesterday, the salaries of doctors will grow more than those of nurses, and those of university professors more than those of assistants. The projected real growth (above inflation) of salaries in the public sector is 4.3 percent. The cost of servicing the foreign debt will grow by a mere 0.5 percent as compared with this year.

"This year will see a breakthrough as far as debt servicing is concerned," Kolodko told journalists. He also stated that last year's consumption rose by 4 percent, just as much as is projected for the current year and the next. "This the reply of our government and our coalition to social expectations," said the deputy prime minister.

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Inflation in June

According to data of the Finance Ministry that are to be confirmed today, inflation for June was lower than projected—0.9 percent. Kolodko attributes this to the implementation of the anti-inflation package. He claims this is the lowest inflation rate in eight years.

The deputy prime minister states inflation for July may be even lower. Kolodko quickly calculated that it would thus reach approximately 12.8 percent in the second half of this year. Perhaps those calculations will allow him to meet the statutory requirements and reach the 17 percent he is dreaming of.

We should remember, however, that the majority of economists estimate that this year's inflation will be well above 20 percent.

What Is Going on With the Budget?

Kolodko announced he intends to present the Sejm with a draft of next year's budget in the prescribed time, that is, by the end of October. Expenditures on state security and higher education are to grow by a real value of 5 percent. Outlays on housing, school reform, and developing rural areas will also be higher.

State budget expenditures will be cut. Next year, they are to attain a level of 31.99 percent of GDP. This year, the share of budgetary expenditures in the GDP was 33.06 percent. Kolodko claims this points to a positive trend of reducing the role of redistribution within the budget.

Subsidies for social security will decrease by 4.8 percent, and funds allocated to the Agricultural Social Security Fund will be cut by 17.3 percent. Subsidies to the Labor Fund will decrease by 16.5 percent, and expenditures on family benefits by 5.6 percent. Subsidies to economic subjects will fall by 33 percent. Expenditures on housing benefits will be lowered by 16.5 percent.

The disparity between expenditures and revenues that became visible this spring is disappearing. The midyear budget deficit was Z4.15 billion, a mere 47.2 percent of what was projected. The projections provided for an annual deficit of Z8.78 billion. "The ministry controls how taxpayers' money is spent," said Kolodko categorically.

Zero VAT on Books

The deputy prime minister reminded that the government took advantage of its prerogatives and lowered the VAT rate on energy carriers and construction materials and services from 22 percent to 12 percent next year and 17 percent in 1997. A zero percent VAT rate on papers and books was retained. There will be no customs tax on imports of paper for press and book publications.

Kolodko is satisfied with the volume of investment in Poland.

In the first half of this year, the total value of investments was $1.07 billion. Last year that figure was $1.3 billion. A total of $5.4 billion has been invested in Poland thus far.

In terms of the amount of invested capital, the United States is in the lead with completed investments worth $1.7 billion and with a similar amount declared. In second place are international corporations which have already invested $871 million and declared $233.5. Next come Germany ($512 million and $413 million, respectively) and Italy ($378 million and $1.7 billion).

Inflation Figures Disputed

WS0707104495 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Jul 95 p 16

[Article by "DAN": "What Did Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko Have in Mind When Speaking of the Lowest Inflation Rate in Eight Years? Does Eight Mean Four?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Office of Statistics [GUS] does not believe the statement made by Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko on Wednesday [5 July] that the midyear inflation rate fell in June to the lowest level in eight years. No one at the Finance Ministry was able to explain what Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko meant and what rate he had in mind.

"The inflation rate has currently reached the lowest level in eight years," said Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko at a news conference on Wednesday.

He also informed that, according to preliminary estimates carried out by the Finance Ministry he heads, prices in June rose by 0.9 percent. This suggests that from the beginning of this year until the end of June prices have risen by 13.5 percent. The truth is, however, that over the first six months of last year inflation grew by 12.4 percent. It was thus lower and cannot be the rate the deputy prime minister had in mind.

Poland has not seen a price growth rate of 0.9 percent for a long time. The deputy prime minister claims a rate of approximately 1 percent will be maintained for another two months. This is not, however, a record for the last eight years. In 1991, when prices over the whole year rose by as much as 60.4 percent, in August the grew by a mere 0.6 percent.

We tried to find out at the Ministry of Finance what the deputy prime minister had in mind when he spoke

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of the lowest inflation rate in eight years. No one, however, was able to give a clear answer. Despite an announcement made by Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko, the Finance Ministry did not confirm the data on inflation for June.

We learned at GUS that it has still not completed its computations. GUS specialists, however, do not expect the average midyear inflation rate to be the lowest in eight years—it would have to drop by as much as 2 percent. The lowest midyear inflation rate was recorded in 1994 and was 30.8 percent. In May 1995, that rate was 32.8 percent.

We were unable to get hold of Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko because of Chancellor Kohl's visit.

Senate Not To Amend Electoral Law

LD0707120695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Senate has decided not to introduce any amendments to the Sejm draft law on presidential elections in the Polish Republic. The bill deprives persons who do not have Polish citizenship of the right to vote in the election of the head of state.

It was decided to postpone a debate on the so-called police bill because one of the Senate commissions wants to express its opinion in this matter. The Senate will most probably take a stance on this bill in a week's time.

Walesa Against Radio, TV Bill Amendment

WS0707120395 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Jul 95 p 2

[Article by "RAS": "The President and KRRiTV—To Be Continued at the Tribunal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Walesa has lodged a motion with the Constitutional Tribunal to deem several provisions of the amendment to the Radio and Television Law as unconstitutional.

The president's motion will cause a delay in the coming into force of parliamentary amendments which, among others, deprived Walesa of the authority to appoint the chairman of the National Radio and Television Council [KRRiTV] and delegated it to the council members.

A week ago, the Sejm rejected a presidential veto to the amendment on the grounds that it disturbs the balance of powers parliament and the president have over KRRiTV.

In his appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal, the president points out other amendments. He stated that new regulations on programming councils in public radio and television networks are turning them into "guardians of the public interests," a role attributed to KRRiTV.

Walesa is also questioning provisions placing cable television operators under an obligation to air programs produced by licensed private Polish broadcasters.

Television Head on Independence, Campaign

WS0707095195 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 1-2 Jul 95 p 7

[Interview with Wieslaw Walendziak, chairman of the Polish Television SA Board, by Stanislaw Cwik and Jacek Wroblewski; place and date not given: "Walendziak's Case"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [TRYBUNA] Do you feel independent as the director of Polish Television [TVP]?

[Walendziak] I should ask independent of whom? I feel independent of the political forces which would like to run television.

[TRYBUNA] That is, independent of everyone, because just about everyone has recently been criticizing TVP.

[Walendziak] If one day the persons who criticize television are [Freedom Union Deputy] Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, [Democratic Left Alliance Deputy] Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, and [Christian-National Union Chairman] Ryszard Czarnecki, then we should think about whether they do it because TVP is bad, or perhaps because they do not really like the way it presents the image of Poland and reports on the activities of their parties.

[TRYBUNA] However, who needs a television which no one likes?

[Walendziak] In general, it is viewers who like it, which is proved by research. Those who do not like it are politicians. This, however, is a mechanism of democracy, which stands guard over democratic liberties by exposing information which public people would often rather keep secret.

[TRYBUNA] Even though it stands guard over those liberties, members of the board often express their views and define them as rightist.

[Walendziak] The political records of the members of the board differ quite a lot. There is a person among us who was the last secretary of the Primary Party Organization of the Polish United Workers Party in TVP; there is a liberal; there is a former youth activist linked to a movement which was active in the times gone by, and finally, there is myself—also linked to a youth movement, one which was in opposition in those times. Despite that, we manage to cooperate well,

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because the political past proves to be nothing but the past.

Some people resent the fact that we are not taking orders from our former political friends. If I were to give you the list of complaints, the one containing complaints filed by the right wing would be longer than the list of complaints filed by leftist politicians.

[TRYBUNA] Is it not so that the independence of TVP is understood in such a way that the company is run exclusively by the board, that is, that the board is free to do anything it likes both on the silver screen and outside of it?

[Walendziak] This is debatable. I am often accused of reacting hysterically to any criticism of the board and of the company, whereas all I do is defend facts. Now, if I read a statement by Marek Siwiec [member of the National Council of Radio and Television—KRRiT] that I ordered the Television Information Agency to show Aleksander Kwasniewski in only one, clearly specified manner, then I am so surprised that I am at a loss to know what to say. Today it is impossible to do such things. This was possible before 1980, for example, during the visit of John Paul II in Poland. I simply do not practically have such powers.

[TRYBUNA] Who has them, then? Who is responsible for the mistakes which are made from time to time?

[Walendziak] Programs are prepared by people. Decisions are made by heads of editorial staffs, directors of programs. The board deals with general issues only—the finances, management, administration. [passage omitted]

[TRYBUNA] Why do you not want to appear on the television and say, for example, that there is no problem with Walendziak, there is only a problem of independence of public media?

[Walendziak] I have often said that there is no problem with Walendziak. Also, it is not so that only Walendziak guarantees television's independence. In fact there is a far more important problem: How to protect the provisions of the law on public radio and television from politicians' attempts to change them.

I have heard statements, made by serious persons, that the structure of information programs should be altered according to the political parity, or that the board should consist of persons selected by political parties. This worries me. It would mean nothing else but a return to the time when television was dependent on the political world, which was very bad.

[TRYBUNA] However, perhaps dependence on democratically elected representatives of the people would be a better guarantee of television's objectivity than a board which is independent of anyone and anything?

[Walendziak] This is a most fundamental problem. Should public television serve the state or the functionaries of the state? Should it serve the presidency or the president, the Sejm or deputies? For example, our coverage of the Peasant Holiday was quite extensive; still, the Polish Peasant Party did not like it. The party would have liked it if we had shown only activists of this party. I will always defend myself from such a type of television.

[TRYBUNA] Now, perhaps you are a bad director of television. Please note that no one is leveling similar charges at a similar establishment—Polish Radio.

[Walendziak] The radio market is much better developed than the television market. There is competition on the radio market; there are three private nationwide stations. In the case of television, in many areas we do not have any competitors. In the radio service, tension is eased naturally, while in our company it is eased only when personnel changes are made.

Quite paradoxically, TVP is in the best situation when there is a crisis, a political battle in the state. Then no one has any time to deal with us. That was the case when the Drawsko issue transpired or when the government changed. An interesting thing is that all the heroes of that event were surprised by the objectivity and impartiality of TVP. The same will happen during the presidential campaign. I can guarantee that everyone will be surprised by the objectivity of the campaign on TVP.

[TRYBUNA] Are there any rules set up with which the campaign will be presented?

[Walendziak] We have adopted an appropriate resolution. We are now waiting for KRRiT to make decisions. As soon as the date of the elections is made known, I will want to hold a meeting with all the spokespersons and heads of election staffs. We have a couple of ideas, ones which have tried and tested in big television stations all over the world; however, we want to discuss them.

This is how the "Forum" program, among others, was prepared; the program is very highly evaluated by politicians. We held lengthy discussions with many people and establishments before we finally decided to air it. I guarantee that political circles will be pleasantly surprised by the campaign on TVP. We may often be unpleasant to certain people because we will be very inquiring, but we will not take sides; we will be completely independent.

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[TRYBUNA] Will you be as objective as you were on the 1 May holiday?

[Walendziak] We did not want to offend anyone then. We prepared a pastiche of 1 May demonstrations of the period gone by and none of us thought that the present activists of the left, who stress that they have cut themselves off from the time of real socialism, would be so offended by the program. Then the issue was discussed at an editorial staff meeting and we decided that some of the things were really exaggerated.

[TRYBUNA] No one is satisfied with you as the television director. The Association of Catholic Journalists have put you on the "black list." Still, you seem to feel just fine.

[Walendziak] This is perhaps because I just came back from the Mazury Lake district and my son caught his fist pike. Now, seriously, research—not only the research which we carry out—indicates that viewers evaluate our work pretty well.

[TRYBUNA] How should they evaluate it since there is practically no competition?

[Walendziak] Polsat is a very real competitor. More than half of Poles can watch its programs.

[TRYBUNA] Was it you who invited Lech Walesa to be on television?

[Walendziak] No, it was not. It was the president's idea to meet with us on television.

[TRYBUNA] Does every politician have such a possibility?

[Walendziak] I will gladly admit anyone who wants to talk in front of viewers.

[TRYBUNA] The president suggested that he could protect the government if the television showed more of him. How do you understand this proposal of the president?

[Walendziak] Our meeting with President Walesa was public. We did not hold back anything from viewers... There was no secret agreement, or a promise to transform television into a presidential institution. [passage omitted]

KRRiTV Chief on Media Role

LD0707182995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 7 Jul 95

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiTV] has granted the Catholic Radio Maria new frequencies, thanks to which this station will be audible throughout the entire country. The council expressed its consent for the separation out of the Public Opinion Research Center from the [organizational] structure of television.

In the second concessions-granting procedure, the Council has 233 applications before it. Many of them do not meet the financial conditions regarding the start-up of a radio or television station. As Andrzej Zarebski said, the KRRiTV will announce its decisions next week.

[Zarebski] "There are 233 applications. Fifty of these are for television, five are applications by already extant broadcasters asking for their concessions to be widened, and we have 183 radio applications, of which 71 are also for the widening of extant concessions. According to an initial evaluation by our experts, a small part of the applications exhibit the capital appropriate for the carrying of the intended radio or television enterprise. The KRRiTV will, in the first half of next week, discuss these matters, and it will make a decision."

According to KRRiTV Chairman Marek Jurek, the responsibility of public broadcasters in the approaching presidential election campaign is being discussed at the moment.

[Jurek] "Television ought to not only organize the electoral campaign on its own account, but it ought to inform public opinion about the significance of this event, about the constitutional consequences of the election of a president. We are, above all, discussing the consequences arising out of the responsibility of television, as a broadcaster, for the course of the campaign. In the near future we will already be able to issue resolutions regulating this matter."

Upon the basis of the law, Andrzej Zarebski said, a broadcaster is responsible for the entirety of his program.

[Zarebski] "The responsibility of the broadcaster, that is of radio and television, for the content of programs that are propaganda or electoral programs of particular [electoral] committees—here the law does not give any leeway, any opportunity, such as the way in which television and radio once wished to get out of it, by saying that television and radio are not responsible for the content of electoral programs prepared by [electoral] committees. The law says that the broadcaster is responsible for the entirety of his program, and also for electoral broadcasts. They will avoid the transmission of content that transgresses the law."

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Council of Ministers' Office Chief Interviewed

WS0707144995 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 7-9 Jul 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Marek Borowski, head of the Office of the Polish Council of Ministers, by Ryszard Choroszy; place and date not given: "Decentralization of the State and Finances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Choroszy] What are the Border Guards [SG], the Vistula Military Units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [JN MSW], and the Military Police [ZW] currently doing to implement the project of improving public safety?

[Borowski] A lot has already been done within the frameworks of that project. The action that has been taken points to future trends of its development.

The most noteworthy objectives of the SG include:

—strengthening border watchpoints in the Podlasie, Pomorze, and Lublin regions (increasing the number of soldiers from 499 to 524);

—forming small units protecting alert groups [jednostki zabezpieczaniagrup alarmowych] out of officers from the voluntary services; by 31 March, 1995, 57 such groups were formed and currently total 560 people;

—organizing two-or-three-day-long emergency patrols at selected border crossings and on 15 access roads and car markets.

The JN MSW were given the following tasks within the program:

—they may receive special powers in emergency situations to protect the top centers of power and state administration;

—military guards may obtain orders to react to attempts at breaking into cars, violating public order, and any hooliganism;

—special pyrotechnical units of the JN MSW are to counter bomb attacks, including in private facilities.

The Military Police can interfere with civilian life only if military people and buildings are endangered. Current regulations prohibit military police patrols from carrying out operations similar to those of regular police patrols. I think this should be changed.

[Choroszy] The Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] is widely considered to be a superministry. Do you want to curb your own powers within the projected reform of the administrative center? If so, how?

[Borowski] The URM reform project provides for its dissolution, or rather its dismembering. First of all, the Chancellery of the President of the Council of Ministers will be established, made up of the Prime Minister's Cabinet and the General Secretariat of the Government. The latter will render substantial technical services to the Council of Ministers and its committees. The head of the Prime Minister's Chancellery will be subordinated directly to the prime minister and will not be a member of the Council of Ministers.

A second group of objectives implemented by the current head of URM will be delegated to the Central Office of Public Administration.

The third group of tasks currently carried out by URM will be taken over by the European Integration Committee. It will be a center coordinating processes of adjustment and integration with the European communities.

The last successor of some of the URM tasks will be the Governmental Center for Strategic Studies. It will be responsible for, among other things, analyses, projections, and developing both economic and social programs. The center would deal primarily with long-term studies which so far have been the task of dispersed units in the particular ministries that did not cooperate effectively. URM will therefore be dissolved and its tasks will be performed in a more effective way by specialized offices.

[Choroszy] The current government is emphasizing the need of decentralizing the state and public finances. When will the gminas [smallest administrative units] get more power and money?

[Borowski] The government is indeed emphasizing the need of decentralizing the state and public finances. A new competence law is presently being developed that will delegate tasks implemented thus far by ministers and the government administration to voivodes and self-governments. Together with new assignments, the gminas will receive the financial means necessary to implement them. It is still unknown what those competences are to be—a discussion on the issue is still going on in both government and self-government circles. Work is also currently under way to delegate more powers to large cities. A relevant draft law is to be debated at the Sejm in the nearest future.

This type of distributing powers is due to the fact that some of the tasks of the public administration can be implemented only by huge and rich gminas. Specific dates and the scope of authority will be determined, however, only once the government and self-government reach an agreement.

As far as the powiats [administrative units made up of several gminas that are to be established] are concerned,

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analyses are still being carried out (including a simulation of the effects of their establishment), and a decision will be possible only after they are completed.

Sejm Deputy Interviewed on Regional Reform

MM0707160195 Opole NOWA TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 29 Jun 95 p 5

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Joachim Czernek of the German Minority Parliamentary Group, a member of the Extraordinary Commission for District Self-Government, by correspondent Malgorzata Wawryszewicz; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wawryszewicz] For a while now we have not heard any news about the commission's work. Could it be that it has completed its task?

[Czernek] No. Our work has stopped at Article 38. We have completed Chapter Five, which deals with district property. Last week, on the other hand, a meeting was held—in which I took part—between the commission presidium and the experts, during which the shape of the next chapter, dealing with district finance, was discussed. The article stating that the districts will follow their own financial policies on the basis of their own budgets is not in question, but the definition of what constitutes district property has revealed that there are substantive doubts on that point. The draft law provides that the financial issues will be dealt with by a separate law, which would allow us to finalize our work on the original law.

[Wawryszewicz] But at least you have worked out an unequivocal definition of the district, have you not?

[Czernek] Last year's questionnaire sent to all parishes placed districts, as it were, in opposition to parishes, which predetermined the parishes' response, since it suggested that the new districts would curtail their autonomy. That was an evident falsehood, since the districts will constitute separate and independent self-governing structures. Parishes will not lose out as far as their autonomy is concerned.

[Wawryszewicz] Are all commission members fully convinced of this, though?

[Czernek] There are some deputies who believe that districts are unnecessary and maintain that the reform should be continued by increasing the powers granted to parishes and creating self-governing voivodships. This view is held especially by deputies from the Polish Peasant Party parliamentary group, but the majority holds a different opinion. A further widening of the parishes' powers is irrelevant because of the kind of tasks this would involve. We are talking about tasks which are by definition of a "supralocal" significance.

[Wawryszewicz] Such as, for example, education at postprimary level, hospitals, or roads other than local parish roads....

[Czernek] Yes, and also tasks in such fields as culture, environmental protection, urban planning, construction and planning inspection, public law and order, and so on—in other words, matters which are at present within the remit of government or special administration. But the main fields in our concern are indeed postprimary education and the health service, both of which urgently need to be put under social regulation.

[Wawryszewicz] And it is hardly fair to expect responsibility for a high school or a hospital to be assumed entirely by a given town or city if that facility serves the needs of the inhabitants of several neighboring parishes....

[Czernek] It is possible, but would it be expedient? Advocates of extending parishes' powers maintain that parishes could combine into higher units, such as parish associations, in order to carry out such tasks. However, in that case everything would then depend on local initiatives, so the eventual structures created in this way could well be very different and far from cohesive. In my opinion, we should regulate this by passing a decree stating that the structure responsible for carrying out tasks of a local, supraparish nature is the self-governing district.

[Wawryszewicz] But the results of public opinion surveys which Minister Strak was so eager to quote showed that local councilors from small parishes are afraid of the proposed districts and do not want them.

[Czernek] These fears are generated exclusively by ignorance born of a lack of information. If local parish authorities are told, albeit not in so many words, that the districts would take away a proportion of their powers, and even their finances, if the rumor is that the districts will be placed above them and that their own autonomy will have to give way to their superior status, then I must say that I understand their fears very well indeed. But if we assure them that there is no way any of their powers will be taken away from them, such fears will disappear. This is because the rationale for the local self-government reform consists in taking over certain powers and a certain proportion of financial resources from the central administration.

[Wawryszewicz] Minister Borowski, who heads the Council of Ministers Office, recently cited the beginning of 1997 as the possible launch of the district system. Other dates had been quoted prior to his latest statement; is this last date realistic?

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[Czernek] The date depends entirely on the goodwill of the ruling coalition, which commands a parliamentary majority. If the goodwill is there, the districts will be introduced. The goodwill will also decide the pace at which the commission proceeds with its work. This pace has been very poor recently. And it should be added here that the district law will be only the first of many steps which have still to be made. The next one will be to regulate the finance question, and then there are about 80 laws which need to be changed, all of which concern the powers to be taken over by the new districts. These will constitute the so-called district-related laws.

[Wawryszewicz] Meanwhile almost a year has passed since the commission first started its work. So what is its most important achievement to date?

[Czernek] I actually see it as a wasted year. Given sufficient determination and goodwill, the law could have been drafted within a couple of months.

[Wawryszewicz] The German minority favors the idea of the new administrative districts. Is it because they will represent the second area—after the parishes—which will give them opportunities to assume power locally?

[Czernek] It is in our common interest, as Polish citizens, to see our state administration become most effective, to have full democracy introduced as soon as possible, and to reach a state of prosperity. The district represents one of the ways in which this goal can be reached. The question of gaining a chance to discharge power in the district remains of secondary importance here. We are all Polish citizens and we all have opportunities to participate in the exercise of power. The composition of the district councils and the leaders of these councils will be decided by the local population in the appropriate elections. However, it is true that we regard the question of decentralization of the state as a matter of overriding importance which is in the state's best legitimate interests. This is the goal for which we aim. We have already proved this point in the field of parish self-government structures: As far as we are concerned, the most important thing is not the exercise of power but good economic management and proper discharge of the tasks with which we are entrusted.

[Wawryszewicz] Thank you for talking to us.

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Defense Official Discusses NATO Integration

AU0807191995 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 28 Jun 95 p 3

[Interview with Ioan Mircea Pascu, state secretary at the National Defense Ministry, by Ralu Filip; place and date not given: "The Decision on NATO Admittance Will Be a Political One; Therefore, It Will Inevitably Be a Subjective One as Well"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Filip] The issue of NATO expansion in the region of the former communist countries has generated major political and military interest both in Romania and in other countries. Recently our prime minister, foreign affairs minister, and the Supreme Defense Committee of the Country reasserted Romania's wish to integrate within the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. However, Romania's wish alone is not sufficient to achieve this, especially considering that somewhere beyond Romania's borders, things seem to be getting a bit complicated. I am referring to the plan presented by Karsten Voigt, president of the North Atlantic Assembly, a blueprint that envisions the expansion being achieved in two phases, and Romania is not among the countries to be admitted into NATO in the first phase. I am also referring to the stance displayed by Russia, which refuses to accept the integration of Romania and Poland, at least within NATO. In your opinion, what are Romania's chances in NATO's expansion process?

[Pascu] There are several factors governing the expansion process. Some of these factors pertain to the individual performance of the candidate countries. Personally, I believe that if Romania manages to become—within an acceptable period of time—a market in the true sense of the word, I am certain it will be put on every list regarding its integration within European and Euro-Atlantic structures. I say this because the market will have to be integrated, investments will be made, and the need will arise to protect those investments. On the other hand, there are also factors pertaining to the Western countries. So far, they have not reached any agreement on the final list of candidates. Mr. Claes stated that this is an issue that will be debated at a later time; as for the time being, the Western countries are still in the general stage establishing the criteria. Despite this, I cannot believe that no one is at least thinking about the next stage, which will inevitably come, when they will establish who is to be admitted in which order, and so on and so forth. Now the way in which they solve this issue depends on the inter-western balance of forces that will exist at that time. As far as Russia is concerned, they oppose in principle the NATO integration of any of its former allies. And I do not think that if there will be an admission at all, it will be made without previously obtaining the accord—even if just tacit—of Russia. This combination of factors, with each of them following its own logic, will add up to a resultant, and this resultant will lead to the inclusion of countries in this region within the Western structures.

[Filip] The Visegrad Pact member countries claim that it is more justified for them to be admitted to NATO than it is for Romania because their economic and political successes are more substantial, and that their integration within NATO prior to ours would simply be an acknowledgment, a reward for those successes. There are opinions according to which they are even being backed in the integration race. How do you assess all this?

[Pascu] The countries you mentioned hold certain advantages that, in my opinion, were artificially created. What I mean is the fact that investments were made on a priority basis in those countries, and I think it is unfair to now say that they achieved more success compared to the countries that were deliberately avoided. Besides, those countries are still following the old military thinking, which envisages European conflict situations in the East-West terms rather than North-South, as it increasingly appears to be the case. This implicitly means that both Romania and Bulgaria will have to remain in the same category as before 1989, when they were not regarded as parts of central Europe. Currently they do belong to central Europe, but to its "southern" part. On the basis of this "artificiality," a certain image was created, which is still valid and which is being used by others as a "capital." The problem that is becoming increasingly apparent is the discrepancy between reality in those countries and the idyllic image about them existing in the West, especially regarding their economies. The current situation in Hungary, for instance, is illustrative from this point of view. There are signs showing that with the passage of time, their economic situation will deteriorate to a certain extent, and when this is perceived by the Western decisionmakers, one can expect this to have an impact on the decisions they will make. This is precisely why the Visegrad countries are now trying to conceal these discrepancies and keep insisting on their still positive image compared to other countries. On the other hand, the race to join NATO has not been completely decided from the very start. It is a long-term race that today can be led by one of the candidates, but tomorrow the leader might be another one, and so on and so forth. However, if it has already been decided on who the winner is while the race is still on, I would also consider this as unfair and harmful for the ones who made such a decision.

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[Filip] Some people believe that reform is stagnating in Romania and that its perspectives are unclear, whereas Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are more advanced in the reform process, and, therefore, the investments made in those countries are much more substantial than the ones made in Romania. On the basis of this discrepancy, certain analysts believe that the Visegrad countries are more likely to be able to afford the costs of their integration, which is an additional advantage for them. What is your opinion?

[Pascu] Let me ask you a question—to what extent do you believe that these countries, Poland and especially Hungary, which have huge foreign debts, could afford the expenses involved in NATO admittance more easily than Romania, which currently has less money than they do, but does not have any considerable foreign debts to pay? And let me tell you something else. Hungary is currently being blamed for the fact that privatization has slowed down. Owing to this, they recently replaced their minister in question. The government has to take austerity measures that are unpopular and create tension. I mention this just to balance their economic advantage. Fundamentally, I am not certain that economic performance will be the principal criteria for NATO admittance.

[Filip] In that case, what will be the principal criteria?

[Pascu] The decision on NATO admittance will eminently be a political one. Therefore, it will inevitably be a subjective one as well.

[Filip] What are the rules of the game regarding this issue?

[Pascu] The rules of the game actually boil down to the following aspect pertaining to the security of the European continent: What draft should we elaborate to ensure security and stability, which are maximum in the West, expanding toward the East, where they are minimal, so as to ensure a uniform degree of security and stability throughout the continent? The answer they found is by expanding the Western structures in the East. However, there is also a political dimension to this problem. The West is just about to recuperate the losses it suffered at the end of the last world war to the favor of the USSR. There was a time when the West "possessed" these countries because they used to be capitalist ones with market economies and democracy, but owing to the reality existing at the end of World War II, they "ceded" them to the former USSR. However, at the end of the 1980's, the USSR withdrew from these countries, leaving them in a provisional state. As a consequence of this, the need arose to reintegrate them in the Western world. But the question here is: How much can be "recuperated" depends on whether it is done at once or rather in successive stages, how to achieve this, and so on and so forth. This is the fundamental question and the essence of the entire political game. And let me tell you something else: One can envisage the following situation, setting out from the fact, which is very well known, that the percentage established for Romania by the West and the Soviets at the end of the war was 90 percent Soviet and 10 percent Western influence. Actually we were in the opposite situation as Greece was with its 90 percent Western and 10 percent Soviet influence. But let me return to what I wanted to say: Compared to the aforementioned proportions, would an alteration to 89 percent Russian and 11 Western influence theoretically mean a gain for the West?! But let us not forget that economically, as well as from the ideological point of view, Western influence has already become predominant in these countries. And this is precisely the basis on which one could perhaps discuss the share each of those political influences could possibly take for itself.

[Filip] It is quite obvious that the NATO expansion depends on Russia and that the West is still afraid of Moscow, being ready to make concessions to please it. How are current relations between NATO and Russia?

[Pascu] It is not so much that they would make concessions, but rather a very cautious stance displayed by the West in this respect, considering Russia's situation and position. On the other hand, it is my belief that if NATO had guarantees that Russia will never become a threat for its security, the entire discussion would be conducted in totally different terms.

[Filip] Since you mentioned World War II, do you think that we are witnessing the remaking of the spheres of influence that preceded it?

[Pascu] I would not put it that way, because the situation is not the same. Let me give you just one parameter: Before the war, each country had to manage on its own, as alliances used to be bilateral or trilateral only. Today we have multilateral institutions, comprising every country of the continent, or most of them. Therefore the situation is fundamentally different.

[Filip] I say this because if we were witnessing the remaking of the old influence spheres, according to some analysts, this would be due to a certain affinity Germany displays with respect to Czechoslovakia [as published], Poland, and Hungary, countries that used to be in its influence sphere before the war, too. They also claim that Romania is not in the center of Germany's attention, and considering that Germany has a very important position in NATO, this would be a further advantage for the Visegrad Pact countries.

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[Pascu] The affinity you mentioned comes from the geographic location. In the past, this location has created certain traditions and political reflexes that manifest as often as they can. As long as the Soviet power "covered" Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Germany found itself unable to do more that it was allowed to do. Nevertheless, by the "Ostpolitik" policy of Chancellor Brandt, Germany still expressed interest. The moment the Soviet power dissipated, Germany seemed to regain, to a certain extent, its historical reflexes and intensified its penetration in the countries you mentioned. However, I would like to tell you about a different scenario that I, myself, have heard mentioned en passant. According to it, given Romania's larger dimensions compared to those of Hungary or the Czech Republic, our "turn" should come only after Germany has sufficient resources available again—that is, after it concludes its priority investments in the former GDR [German Democratic Republic]. I do not wish to comment on the likelihood of this scenario, but what do you think? Why should it be unlikely?

[Filip] Well, perhaps because it resembles our long, long "wait for the Americans".... Or because we do not have traditions generated by the geographic location, similar to those of either Hungary or Poland.

[Pascu] If one carefully examines Romanian traditions in the economic field, one sees that Romania's principal partner after our country became an independent state was Germany. What we did then was try to counterbalance our economic dependence on Germany, an inevitable dependence, as a matter of fact, by furthering our political and military relations with the then adversaries of Germany, namely France and Great Britain. Our principal economic partner is Germany again. Even during the communist regime, Germany used to be our second most important economic partner, following the USSR.

[Filip] Another reason why your scenario might not correspond to reality is the fact that the Germans might still consider our country as the one that betrayed them during World War II.

[Pascu] Well, do the Germans today consider those who have been their allies over the past 50 years as the ones who defeated them in 1945?

[Filip] Our bilateral treaties with Hungary, Ukraine, and Russia are still not signed. What are the consequences of this for Romania?

[Pascu] Looking at it realistically, I do not think that things are [illegible]matic as some claim them to be. There is no peril of a conflict for territorial claims between, for instance, Romania and Hungary. Negotiations are under way with all the countries you mentioned. There are some sensitive elements on both sides and we will have to find the formulae that satisfy everyone. The problem consists in the way the absence of those treaties is interpreted. If that interpretation is a negative one, this is due to certain circles abroad, which claim that owing to the absence of those treaties Romania's situation allegedly lacks security, as a consequence of which it cannot be admitted to NATO. I, however, wish to regard this issue in the more general context of the all-out European integration, as our Foreign Affairs Ministry so rightly does. Well, from this angle, Romania has concluded treaties with every EU-associated country, except Hungary. Why should we not look at it from this angle?

[Filip] Some people came up with the idea that if we had signed the treaty with Hungary, this would have favored it in the race to join NATO, because whereas Hungary would have had treaties with all its neighbors, we would have still had unsigned treaties with Ukraine and Russia.

[Pascu] I know this idea shared by part of the Romanian public opinion, including certain political circles. Well, there is a tiny little bit of truth in it, but only to the extent to which those who decide on NATO admittance tend to believe that the conclusion of the treaty between Romania and Hungary will be tantamount to settling all the problems existing between them. Personally, I believe that this treaty—even though it has and will play a positive role and which eventually will be concluded, is unable to represent, just in itself, the essence of bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary. It will certainly represent an important part of those relations, but it will never be able to substitute itself for the bilateral relations between the two countries.

[Filip] There are contradictory discussions regarding the Romanian-Hungarian treaty, generated especially by the inclusion or noninclusion of Recommendation 1201. What is the Army's opinion on Recommendation 1201? Does its inclusion in the treaty with Hungary offer legal grounds for the Hungarian minority to gain territorial autonomy?

[Pascu] I cannot speak for the Army on this issue, because each of its members has the right to his own opinion. However, I have noticed that on the whole, the Army shares the same opinion as the country—and this cannot be different. On the issue you have raised, it is material to succeed in overcoming an emotional approach to this problem and regard things in an analytical way. Then we will see, on the one hand, whether we are talking about a recommendation whose application is going to be monitored, but, on the

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other hand, nobody can tell me how I should apply it, and even less, to implement it to the detriment of my most obvious national interest—that is, the preservation of Romania as an indivisible and independent unitary national state.

[Filip] Several politicians claim that failing to sign the treaty with Hungary and failing to accept Recommendation 1201 will determine our country's integration in the European Union and NATO. How important are the treaty with Hungary and Recommendation 1201 for Romania's integration in NATO?

[Pascu] I have to repeat it—they are important to the extent that those who are called upon to answer for NATO's destinies wish to consider them important. Thus, after all, it is a matter of interpretation. Regarding the second part of your question, I believe that for NATO, it is more important to have the treaty concluded than to contain by all means the Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201. This becomes relevant only to the extent it can facilitate or hinder the conclusion of the treaty. I do not believe that anybody in NATO would specifically wish for the inclusion of the recommendation in the treaty if it is going to cause the deterioration of the state of security in the area—that is, hamper the attainment of the goal NATO proposed itself when insisting on the conclusion of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty.

[Filip] And since we have been talking about treaties, some newspapers wrote about the fact that Romania will accept the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in its bilateral accords with Ukraine and Russia, and this is the basis for the idea that the reunification of the country will be given up. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Pascu] These affirmations do not take into account obvious elements. One of them is that the notation that Romania wishes to include in the treaty with Russia and Ukraine regarding the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is aimed at attaining moral and historical restoration, and not the recognition of some so called "territorial rights," because these rights, even if recognized, can never be exercised, as long as Romania wishes to respect the Helsinki Accord. And for Romania this accord is and will always be sacred. Moreover, the reason for insisting on the repudiation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is to eliminate the likelihood of having such practices repeated, which, in itself strengthens the Helsinki Accord. On the other hand, if we were not to observe the Helsinki Accord on our eastern border, how could we call for the accord to protect us on our Western border? This was precisely the essence of the Dniester conflict in 1992. It was, if you wish, a threat but, at the same time, also a trap set for Romania to get involved in that conflict through the exacerbation of emotions and thus, increase its vulnerability at the other borders.

[Filip] Therefore, could one state that the current borders in Europe have not been fixed by the Trianon or the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact but by the Helsinki Accord?

[Pascu] Certainly. Therefore, the way in which the issue is raised is false and is motivated by reasoning that I do not want to discuss now.

[Filip] More and more people start believing that, through successive conditions set to Romania, NATO is humiliating us and is hurting our national pride, and they ask themselves whether, under such conditions, it is still worth joining this Euro-Atlantic structure. What do you have to say about this aspect?

[Pascu] If the price for our joining NATO is Romania's federalization, I believe that we do not even have to discuss this issue further. Romania will be the first one to give up the idea of joining NATO. But the issue has to be regarded in a more nuanced manner. One the other hand, what does humiliation mean? If for instance, all NATO states are submitted to a set of rules which is generally valid, and you want to join by changing the respective rules, I do not think that you can say that you place yourself on a realistic position. We will have to accommodate to NATO rules, however, this act will have to go just so far as not to affect, in structural terms, the national interests of our country. Our national interests have been examined and the conclusion reached was that, if things are presented in an equal manner to all NATO member countries, the way in which they are presented now, then this matter is acceptable. If Romania notices that it is facing a second rate statute in NATO, then things will be reconsidered.

[Filip] What is the proportion between the price to be paid for NATO integration and what Romania will gain by NATO admittance? Will we pay more than it is worth? Will we not pay more than we get?

[Pascu] I think there are things that cannot be measured in these terms. The association to a structure in which the "policy of power" is seriously restricted by the character of the respective institution, by the many-sided character of NATO, cannot be measured in terms of money. And this is a fundamental issue and the reason why Romania wishes to belong to that structure.

[Filip] What does integration in NATO mean to Romania?

[Pascu] It is a fundamental component of the process of integration in continental structures. One cannot wish for admittance only in certain structures and not

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in others. Integration involves all aspects, including security. A second element is a greater protection for Romania from general political power practices. Thus, this is a structure in which the policy of power is practiced by different rules than in the structures outside NATO. And it also means, if you wish, a guarantee that Romania will be able to become modernized under conditions of increased security.

[Filip] The admittance of Turkey in NATO was due at that time mainly to its geo-strategic location. What role will Romania's geo-strategic location play? I ask you this because opinions have been different on this issue lately. Some people say, for example, that our country's geographical position is no longer important for NATO because the Americans and even NATO are greatly interested in Ukraine. Is this true?

[Pascu] Romania's geo-strategic position is incontestable. However, this is a double-edged sword because Romania, from this point of view, is as important for the West as it is for the East. The difference that I could mention in the case of Turkey is that Turkey has never been included in Russia's sphere of influence and has not even been an ally of the Russians, as was Romania. That is the core of fundamental differences....

[Filip] It is also said that as far as the integration in NATO is concerned, this is only business, meaning that Romania would become a market for the arms of the American and Western military industry. Is this true?

[Pascu] The problem can be raised in the same way as in the case of Russia, which loses an arms market, the market of its former allies. One of the explanations for the wish of some countries to be or not to be included in NATO is also the gaining or the losing of arms markets in central European countries. However, I believe that in real terms, this possibility should be regarded in a more subtle manner. Currently, there is no standardization within the ranks of the NATO member countries, either as regards military equipment or weapons that they are using. Thus, it is even more difficult to anticipate that we will have to totally conform to some rigid standards. What standards? Whose standards? There is NATO-type ammunition, NATO-type caliber, but the cannon can be manufactured by Britain or by Americans. Not everybody has to have American, British, or German cannons. A prospect is taking shape now for a standardization of some essential categories, without which NATO member countries cannot really cooperate. However, this does not mean to completely change the inventory, as it is believed in our country and in some other central European capital cities. (I do not know who could have come up with this theory). Apart from this, the issue of standardization will not be solved overnight. And then, inter-operativeness will mean to design some systems that enable two different systems to communicate. Therefore, the effort will be directed toward such issues and not perfect analogy. Third, the chances to join NATO are greater for those who can ensure their own defense to a higher extent because NATO does not to incur additional expenses related to its expansion. And the act of ensuring security under current circumstances is carried out on the basis of the existing arsenals, which must be kept in a state of operation. Thus, here are at least three parameters that show a different aspect of this issue of inventory and arsenals of the two groups of countries.

[Filip] Thus, NATO integration does not mean doing away with the defense industry?

[Pascu] Not in the least. It rather means to assume certain norms, quotas, production standards and others that currently prevail in NATO. And it also means cooperation in the area of arms manufacturing with the respective countries. In no way does this mean to discard Romania's arms industry. Moreover, since the prospects of Romania's inclusion in NATO are not clearly stated, the reasons to preserve this industry are even bigger.

[Filip] How capable is Romania of ensuring its security compared to the other former communist countries?

[Pascu] I would only like to refer to the military factors and I would like to stress a number of advantages of the Romanian Army. First of all, this is an army that has never been Sovietized. In the 1960's, Romania no longer trained officers in Moscow, something that cannot be said about the other former Warsaw Pact allies. The Romanian Army had its own military doctrine, which, in our case, had a national and defensive character while the other allies shared the Warsaw Pact doctrine, imposed by the USSR. Thus, the Romanian Army is used to thinking with its own head and act according to its own concepts. On the other hand, our army's discipline and internal structures have been preserved at a much higher degree than in other countries. We do not have a phenomenon of the Armed Forces' disintegration, as one can see in other countries. All these elements have been recognized not only by us, but also by those who have come into contact with us.

[Filip] How then can you explain the accusations against President Iliescu in a letter published by ROMANIA MARE, a letter allegedly signed by 300 officers? Is there any dissension in the Army on the issue of NATO integration? Is there any dissatisfaction?

[Pascu] I am consternated. I only heard about the respective letter on the plane upon my return from Dresden. And the consternation stems from the fact

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that such extremes could be reached by circulating some fabrications. Because, I personally had never encountered such differences of opinion like there is between what the country wants and what the 300 so-called military cadres want. On this issue, I completely agree with Army General Vasile Ionel who asks the publication, and if it refuses, asks the 300 officers who allegedly signed the letter, to display courage and reveal their identity. I am sure that if they had the courage to publicly discuss an issue that they are certain can seriously harm national interests, then they will not hesitate to publish their names. This would be honest. This would be in line with military conduct. If they refuse to do so, I think the conclusion is obvious. On the other hand, apart from the enormity of some theses nonchalantly circulated in the respective writing, I have to ask myself what the reason is for its publication? Was it not maybe precisely to create anti-NATO feelings among the Romanian people, which could be brought up against Romania exactly now, when decisive decisions are being taken regarding NATO expansion? Then, if one were to judge form a professional viewpoint the enormity of the affirmations in that letter, one would reach the conclusion that this is precisely its goal and that we are facing the work of some professionals on matters of diversion. But, since I am not the one who is called upon in the first place to give my opinion, I leave this to those who are authorized to do so. As a matter of fact, as far as the Ministry of National Defense is concerned, it has already stated its position and has clarified things.

[Filip] I would like you to comment on the following international situation: There is tension in relations between Ukraine and Russia, similarly between Greece and Turkey, Greece and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Albania, and Serbia, Serbia and Croatia, not to mention the conflicts in the former USSR and Bosnia. Romania is in the middle of this hotbed. Is there a danger that these conflicts might escalate? Is Romania in danger?

[Pascu] There is a danger of escalation of these conflicts. And if somebody asked what is currently the most likely threat to Romania's security, the answer would be the likelihood that one or all of these conflicts might expand and get out of control, a situation in which, in one way or another, geographically speaking, we will have no chance to move ourselves away from this conflict. However, we are trying to reduce this potential of conflict, by involving ourselves actively, as much as we can and as much as we are asked to do so, in the efforts of seeking solutions. We do not share the opinion with those who believe that one can fish in troubled waters, but rather we wish to clear the water and thus allow the situation to clarify and remove this danger and eliminate this source of danger from our vicinity.

[Filip] You have just returned from Dresden, where you, together with Foreign Minister Melescanu, attended the proceedings of a NATO workshop on issues of political-military decisions. With what conclusions have you returned?

[Pascu] Mixed. There are both negative but also positive things. For example, the assurances granted by the general command and of NATO forces and U.S. troops in Europe, General G. Joulwan, that he is seeing to it that the interests of all partner countries in relations with the alliance are respected. As regards negative aspects, we still have to examine things and think them over.

[Filip] What if we are not accepted into NATO. Who will be held responsible?

[Pascu] I think we should refrain from such ideas of blaming somebody, because if we really want to blame somebody, we will have to equally blame those who did not have the courage or the interest to accept Romania into NATO. But I believe it is still too early and unjustified to do so.

Iliescu Condemns UDMR Stand on Education Law

LD0807105695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a press statement, Romanian President Ion Iliescu denied that the education law negatively affects minority education in the country.

Ion Iliescu called the statements of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], according to which the education law equals to cultural genocide, unfair, and inciting. He confirmed that Romania is a democratic state, thus the minority cannot force its views on the majority.

Iliescu is to meet representatives of the UDMR later today to discuss the consequences of the education law which had already been adopted by the Romanian parliament.

Iliescu To Consider Claims

AU0807155995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President Ion Iliescu and a group of UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] parliament members in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies held a meeting today at Cotroceni Palace.

Following the two-hour talks, President Iliescu said that after the first reading of the Education Bill, he

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did not detect anything that would hamper education in the mother tongue and that he would consider the observations made by the UDMR representatives.

President Iliescu termed the UDMR legislators' decision to boycott the Parliament debates on the education bill as inadequate. He also termed as incorrect the UDMR's public criticism of the Constitutional Court, which so far has failed to express its stance on the law.

UDMR Chairman Bela Marko pointed out that in the opinion of the UDMR and the ethnic Hungarian community, the consequences of this law are devastating for the ethnic minorities and rejected assertions according to which the stance displayed by the UDMR is inciting, report our correspondents Sorina Man and Sorin Croitorescu.

UDMR on Talks With Iliescu

LD0807192195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 8 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Negotiations between parliament members of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and Romanian President Ion Iliescu ended without success today. Therefore, the UDMR would take up with international organizations the Romanian Education Act which is extraordinarily disadvantageous from the point of view of mother tongue education. Our reporter, Peter Marvanyi, has telephoned Sandor Konya-Hamar, a UDMR deputy in the Romanian Parliament. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Konya-Hamar] The meeting has lasted two-and a half hours but ended without substantive results. Right from the start, Iliescu tried to take an aggressive and demanding tone. [passage omitted]

In effect, the president took the other side, he failed to assume the role of a moderator. We have also failed to make him promise—a promise which would have been important for us—that he will perhaps review those issues to which we object in the act. [passage omitted] [Marvanyi] [passage omitted] What possible legal steps remain for the HDUR?

[Konya-Hamar] [passage omitted] The UDMR's crisis team is at work. Students, organizations of parents and the teachers, too, are trying to do what they can. However, we do not want to say that we will launch a civic disobedience campaign because at this stage we are not talking about it. In any case, we will appeal to international forums and to democratic institutions asking them to intervene, to mediate.

However, from the behavior today we have concluded that we cannot have much hope. [end recording]

UDMR Vows 'Mass' Actions

LD0807201495 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 8 Jul 95

[From the "Newsreel" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The meeting between Romanian President Ion Iliescu and UDMR leaders has been been unsuccessful. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] Bela Marko, chairman of the UDMR, has told "Newsreel" that the UDMR has exhausted all parliamentary possibilities and it will now use other means soon to protest the introduction of the Education Act. [passage omitted]

[Begin Marko recording] [passage omitted] It will be necessary to demonstrate a kind of mass solidarity—even by holding demonstrations and mass rallies. These kinds of actions could take place mostly in the autumn, probably in September. The possibility of a kind of boycott in schools has also been raised—here we are not talking about a boycott of all school activities, but about ways of eliminating the consequences of this act. However, we have not yet decided on this. [passage omitted] [end recording]

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Federal

Milosevic Said Sending Troops to Bosnian Serbs

BR0707140695 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 Jul 95 p 2

[Aticle by Angel Santa Cruz: "Milosevic Sends Troops to Bosnian Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—While the United Nations is extending for another 75 days, until the end of September, the easing of the international sanctions against the Belgrade regime, the evidence suggests that Milosevic not only has not severed his ties to Radovan Karadzic's regime, with which he officially broke almost a year ago, but has begun to assist it openly—even militarily. In addition to returning several thousand Serb refugees to the war fronts of Bosnia and Croatia over the past few weeks, Belgrade is sending under camouflage special units of its own police in order to fight on Bosnian soil alongside Karadzic's troops.

Operation Tara takes its name from the woods from which the infiltration of Bosnia has been taking place, secretly and routinely, at least since last December (four months after the theoretical rift), according to reliable evidence gathered by EL PAIS. The police units are being mobilized in groups of 30 or 40 officers on the pretext of maneuvers on the border with Bosnia. In these incursions, the Serb special forces are taken to the Tara National Park, not far from the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, from where they cross into Bosnian Serb territory along mountain paths. There the changing of uniforms and the units' deployment take place. In one of these operations, last winter, the Serb troops were stationed in trenches throughout eastern Bosnia, where they stayed for a normal month's rotation, without taking part in fighting directly, owing to the harshness of the weather.

The special forces are mobilized on a rotating and compulsory basis, come from various parts of Serbia, and are expressly informed that, for all purposes, these are training exercises. According to agreeing sources in the Serbian capital, the Serbian police—a uniformed paramilitary force permanently in camouflage and totaling nearly 100,000 men, which has artillery units and a larger budget than the Armed Forces—is President Slobodan Milosevic's right hand force. [passage omitted]

Article: 100% Inflation Possible by Year-End

AU0807140995 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Jun 95 p 6

[Article by S. Jovicic on the results of Research by the Institute for Market Research: "Inflation Threatens To Reach 100 Percent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The general situation in the economy and on the market in May and at the beginning of June was less favorable than it was in April, which resulted from the sinking of the solvency of our economy. At the end of May, the number of insolvent companies was somewhat smaller (14,172) than it was the previous month (14,306), but the sum of due obligations grew by 33 percent, so that the economy had a debt of 754.7 million dinars instead of the 566.8 million it had earlier. The supplying of the market with raw and reproduction materials is still unfavorable because, according to the results of the poll, 61 percent of companies do not have enough material for work. However, the situation is somewhat better than it was in April, when 70 percent of the polled companies did not have enough raw materials. Net wages of employees nominally grew by 4.7 percent, but the real purchasing power is far lower. Those were the words of Tomislav Milosavljevic, the director of the Institute for Market Research, at the press conference yesterday.

The drop in the real purchasing power cut the domestic and foreign purchase orders by 5 percent in comparison to April. The prices in the industry grew by 4.2 percent, in wholesale by 5.3 percent, and in retail by 5.1. percent.

Milosavljevic said that, according to the prognosis of the polled businessmen, the falling tendency will continue in the coming trimester, although they hope that, in the meantime, appropriate steps will be taken, so they expect the situation to improve by the end of the year. The biggest obstacle in the coming three months will be the lack of solvent assets in the banks and in the economy, and the deficit of foreign currencies for the import of raw materials. That will cause more and more delays and interruptions in production, as well as an insufficient employment of the capacities and labor. Economic activities are also drastically reduced because of the lack of motivation for export caused by the ever-growing discrepancy between the official exchange rate and the black-market exchange rate. Besides, exports are not sufficiently supported through reduced fiscal obligations or credits for production. The total fiscal obligations of the economy further reduce the possibilities for current business activities, not to mention development.

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Such a situation results in unrestrained monopoly and monetary assaults, which is followed by the rise of prices. If the present conditions in production remain the same until the end of the year, this year's average growth of industrial production would be 8 percent, but, because businessmen expect the situation to deteriorate, the planned growth will be lower, and inflation might go beyond 100 percent by the end of the year.

Experts from the institute say that the way out must be found in the reduction of taxes, contributions, and budget consumption, and, at the same time in the promotion of export, in the abolishing of the discrepancy between the black and the official exchange rate and in customs and credits. That would reduce the existing expenses and calm the prices.

[Box, p 6]

Wages Sink in Real Terms

The growth of the monetary mass and of wages does not create inflation because, in real terms, wages sink. The monetary mass that is held under control does not significantly influence the growth of prices because it has been proved that a monthly growth of 10 percent raises the prices by only 0.15 percent. The inflation is boosted by the growth of the prices of industrial products and services. At the moment, inflationary tendencies are dictated by companies that have monopolies on the market and by the growth of public and common consumption. If nothing is done to change this, prices could grow by 9 percent a month so that, at the end of the year, the total growth of prices would amount to 98 percent.

[Box, p 6]

No Money for Planned Investments

According to the results of the research done in the institute, approximately 70 percent of the polled companies have investment plans. About 40 percent plan to invest more than last year, and 30 percent plan to remain at last year's level. However, 42.8 percent of the companies do not have a settled financial plan. The money has already been provided by 10 percent of companies only.

Serbia

Milosevic Opens First Subway Station in Belgrade

LD0707155695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 7 Jul (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today opened Vukov Spomenik, the first Yugoslav subway station, in Belgrade. On this occasion he said that this station represents a step toward the next century in the development of our railways.

On the platform of the magnificent station he addressed those who carried out the work and numerous officials from the federation, the republic, the city of Belgrade, industry, and the art world. Slobodan Milosevic stressed:

"The railways in Serbia ought to look like this, or to put it better, this is how the network will look when the whole modernization program has been completed and the plans for high-speed trains have been realized, which will mean trains traveling across the Republic at over 200 km per hour." [passage omitted]

Addressing those present, Milosevic said on the platform of the Vukov Spomenik station that he was very pleased to have the privilege of thanking the railway workers of Serbia on behalf of millions of future passengers who will, from today, be using the most modern and the finest subway station in Europe.

"The fact that our country realized such a project successfully at a time when it was under a complete international blockade and unprecedented external pressure proves that this was not able to prevent Belgrade from really acquiring such a splendid facility," Milosevic said.

"Hence the Vukov Spomenik station is not only of practical significance but, without doubt, is also of symbolic importance," the president of Serbia stated. He added:

"Together with a developed agricultural sector and energy industry, which are already at world levels, with the development of modern railways and the construction of big highways and with two navigable rivers and a very high concentration of scientific and technical expertise, our country has enormous scope for successful economic growth.

"I am sure that all of the projects that are being realized today throughout Serbia, and this one which we are opening to mark 7 July [Uprising Day], are in fact indicators that already show a picture of a future, modern, developed, democratic, and prosperous Serbia, which it doubtless will be very soon," Milosevic said.

"To give an impetus to this, it is of the greatest importance for the realization of such goals that peace finally prevails in the Balkans," the Serbian president stressed.

"I can tell you that we will do everything we can to bring peace to the Balkans and achieve conditions for the peoples in the Balkans to live freely and on a basis

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of equality," Milosevic said. He added that, for this reason, there is a further symbolic dimension to today's events—the opening of the Vukov Spomenik station on Uprising Day, 7 July. [passage omitted]

Pledges 'Prosperous' Serbia

AU0707161695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jul 95

[Address by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic at opening of Belgrade's Vukov Spomenik underground station on 7 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] I am very pleased to have the privilege to express my gratitude to the railway workers of Serbia for this congenial welcome on behalf of the millions of future travelers who will from today be using this underground station, which is doubtless the most modern and the most beautiful one in Europe.

The fact that our country managed to realize such a project successfully during the years under a complete international blockade and unprecedented pressure from outside proves that this could not be an obstacle to Belgrade's getting this most beautiful and modern underground station in Europe. It is not only of practical significance but also symbolic. The practical significance I do not need to explain because everyone can see it for himself, but it has great symbolic significance because it is doubtless that it is a step forward in [word indistinct]. Simply put, the railway in Serbia should look like this, or, better still, the entire railway in Serbia will look like this when the project is completed on the modernization of the railway, as well as the project of fast trains at over 200 kilometers an hour through Serbia.

Together with our agriculture and energy system, which are as developed as any in the world, the development of the railway of international standards, the development of road communications, the construction of major highways with [words indistinct], with a very high concentration of scientific and other expertise, our country has enormous potential for successful economic growth, and I am certain that all of this, all these projects that are currently being realized throughout Serbia—including this one today that we are opening to mark 7 July—are an indication of things to come, a picture of a future, developed, modern, democratic, and prosperous Serbia, which is what it will doubtless become in the very near future.

What is needed for the final achievement of this, what will give it a great impetus is for peace finally to reign again in the Balkans. I can tell you that we will do everything for peace to be established in the Balkans, for the conditions to be created for the people in the Balkans to live in freedom and equality. There is another symbolic aspect to this event today, the opening of this station on 7 July, Uprising Day. I would like to use this opportunity to extend my best wishes to all of you here for the 7 July holiday, to congratulate the railway workers of Serbia for such a successfully accomplished job, and of course to congratulate all the companies and workers—because this is the result of our labor, our efforts—on this truly magnificent result, with a wish that there is more success to follow in the future.

Thank you.

Montenegro

Ethnic Albanians Troubled by Emigration

95P20891A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 17 Jun 95 p 5

[Unattributed interview with Asllan Bisha in Tirana; date not given: "Gradually, We Are Going Out Like a Candle"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [FLAKA] In the literary events which were recently held in Tirana (the meeting of writers of children's literature and the promotions of some of FLAKA's books), to which writers from all the Albanians regions were invited, the only author who "broke" the political blockade of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] was Asllan Bisha, an ethnic Albanian writer from Montenegro. For that very reason, a conversation with him was essential for us because, among other things, we rarely have an opportunity to talk to writers and other intellectuals from Montenegro. Asllan Bisha has written both for adults and for children. [passage omitted] The first question which we asked Bisha dealt with the position of the intellectual in the current political milieu in Montenegro.

[Bisha] Albanian intellectuals have a number of problems which we are trying to surmount by organizing the Art-Klub (in Ulcinj) where writers, artists, actors and others meet, financed by our own funds. Various sponsors who are devotees of art and literature also provide assistance. [passage omitted]

[FLAKA] Do specific circumstances determine the political activity of the Albanians in Montenegro?

[Bisha] Albanians in Montenegro, like everywhere else, get along on their own! There is the Democratic League of Albanians which is the first established party and, six or seven months ago, the Albanian Democratic Union was established. These two parties have a nonproductive intolerance of each other. I think that the intellectuals should influence these parties to rise above their disputes and to make the Albanians at least a small factor, if not a large one, so that their voice will be heard. For

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this reason, they should sit down at the table and talk about all the issues which unite them. As far as I know, according to their statements, both parties are concerned with nationality issues. For this reason, it is essential for them to sit down at the table and talk so that they can surmount the Albanian weakness for unnecessary quarrels.

[FLAKA] What are the issues which trouble the Albanians the most?

[Bisha] Albanians in Montenegro have been assigned a special status. They accept the government of Montenegro but they are examining their rights within this status because they see that they are not being achieved. With this government, or with any other, a compromise must be reached so that the Albanians will see their future within Montenegro, without any changes in borders. Autonomy with open borders to Albania would be welcome because we Albanian intellectuals want Montenegro to be a European state.

[FLAKA] There is a movement seeking the independence of Montenegro from the so-called FRY. How can the Albanians help those pro-Montenegrin forces which are working for this goal.

[Bisha] The Albanians in Montenegro must be a progressive factor. They must cooperate with the Montenegrin parties which are opposed to Serbian hegemony, for the independence of Montenegro, so that they will live better tomorrow.

[FLAKA] What characterizes the creativity, what are the trends and the worries of Albanians in the creative fields?

[Bisha] Unfortunately, there are few of us, about 50,000, but, nevertheless, we have creative potential. [passage omitted] We are isolated because the Buna [Bojana] river separates us from Albania. We are far from Kosova and also from the Albanians in Macedonia. We also have obtacles in inter-Albanian intellectual communication. We do not get any books or journals from those places so there is a terribly large vacuum. We are publishing one journal FATI [Fate] so we are trying to do something. It is a journal which has made a name for itself and has a considerable number of readers. In the fall, we hope that we will also have a review for children ZANA [The Mountain Fairy], of which I have been named editor. We met with the Soros Foundation and we hope that something will be done. We do not think that we will change the world with this review but we will certainly enrich the mosaic of creativity by a specific publication.

[FLAKA] Often when we hear about the Albanians in Montenegro, the image of Albanians who have been neglected, who have a feeling of hopelessness, is presented; they live there and when they are forced to move, they move with sadness and with the conviction that they do not have any place to return to! So, is this what makes them diferent from Albanians in Albania, Kosova, and Macedonia?

[Bisha] Unfortunately, it is. We are few and we do not exert any power. We ourselves think that we have been forgotten. We need more contacts and need to comunicate more freely. We need to learn, but something also has to be learned from us; we have something to offer. Ulcinj, where the largest number of Albanians in Montenegro are concentrated, is a city which normally been open. We have communicated with the world because the world has come to us. I would like to say that we need this even more. We need to communicate within the nation and, as a people which is small in number, we also need to communicate with the world. Many languages used to be spoken here [in Ulcinj], as is the practice in an open city. Albanians from abroad often used to come in the past.

[FLAKA] When we spoke about the feeling of hopelessness, we had in mind, in particular, the serious wound affecting the Albanian population in Montenegro, emigration. Don't most of them go with the the feeling that they do not have any place to which to return?

[Bisha] This is exactly the case. Those who go to America, where most of them dream of going, never return. Day after day, they migrate. They go to Australia but they never return. Gradually, we are going out like a candle. However, we hope that we will be able to rise above this situation. We have had problems in the past but we have found the strength to surmount them.

Kosovo

Rugova: U.S. Stance on Province 'Positive'

AU0707202995 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 7 Jul 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The visit to the United States was an official visit, a very important visit within, now regular relations between United States and Kosova, said Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, in a press conference in Prishtina [Pristina] today. He pointed out that United States is a country which has been showing great interest to the Kosova issue, the first country to have provided concrete humanitarian aid, political, and diplomatic support. President Rugova said that the U.S. State Secretary Christopher had reiterated the "Christmas Warning" of President Bush and later President Clinton, that conflict in Kosova will not be tolerated and that preventive measures would be

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taken. He said that meeting with the U.S. State Secretary Christopher was excellent and very significant, and so were meetings with other high-ranking officials of U.S. Administration, Congress, and Senate.

Speaking about his visits to Spain and the meetings he had with Foreign Minister Solana and other Spanish officials, President Rugova said it was the first visit, evaluating it likewise as a very important one. He said that Mr. Solana had assured him that Spain, chairing EU, would commit itself to finding a just solution to the Kosova issue.

President Rugova made an account of the everyday repression in Kosova saying that "unfortunately, violence in Kosova has been continuing with an increased intensity. The recent case of torture to death of Shefki Latifi from Podujeva [Podujevo] has further increased tensions in this district," President Rugova said. He pointed out the violence and repression political activists in Kosova and journalists, as was the case of Ramadan Mucolli, are going through.

President Rugova also mentioned the ongoing Serbian staged trials against former Kosova police officers and called for their immediate release, including all other political prisoners. President Rugova repeated his request for an increased international presence and protection of Kosova.

Continuing, President Rugova conveyed condolences to the family of Alexander Langer on his tragic death. Mr. Langer, a humanist and member of the European Parliament, had showed great commitment to the Kosova issue, Dr. Rugova said.

We discussed the situation in Kosova and the possibilities for a just solution in all the meetings I had in United States, Spain, Albania, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], said Dr. Rugova in reply to a question of a reporter.

He said that President Gligorov of Macedonia was concerned about the situation in Kosova. "We also discussed the demands of Albanians in Macedonia, and we both agreed that tensions in the region have been increasing and that political solutions to all open problems must be reached through peaceful means," President Rugova underscored.

Asked to comment on the American stance towards the Kosova issue, President Rugova said "U.S. stand towards Kosova is a constant and positive one. This stance has been further endorsed in the meeting I had with the U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher."

Ending today's press conference, President Rugova hailed the admission of Albania in the European Council, assessing it as very important event for Albania and Albanians in general.

Serb Police 'Torture' of Albanians Denounced

AU0807172695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English Nos. 652, 653, and 654 on 5, 6, and 7 July carry several reports on Serbian police "repression" and "torture" against Albanians in various provinces.

Sources in Podujevo confirm that 56-year-old Albanian Shefki Latifi, an accountant at the Podujevo Municipal Financing Bureau, died at his home in Podujevo on 4 July after "having been badly tortured at the Serbian police station" in Podujevo. He was arrested in public on 4 July and taken to the local police station. Early in the morning, three Serb policemen raided his home and "harassed" his family and a guest, beating him up "brutally." Serb policemen "demolished his furniture and smashed photographs of President Rugova."

The Prishtina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) reports on 5 July that both the Albanian and his friend were "beaten up together" in a police station. Afterward, the Albanian was taken to the hospital by his friend, who was beaten up again by a policeman he ran into when entering the Podujevo medical center.

The deceased was offered first aid at the Podujevo Medical Center and sent home after half an hour, where he died at around 1140. The CDHRF notes that the Albanian was the "tenth victim of the Serbian police forces" in Kosovo this year.

The Liberal Party of Kosovo issued a statement on 7 July "denouncing the killing of Shefki Latifi by the Serbian police," adding that "this brutal killing proves again that the Serb occupier does not give up its policy of humiliation in Kosova." The statement notes that "the Liberal Party of Kosova denounces the discriminatory acts of the Serbian occupier against the Albanian population and requires from them to stop its policy of torture and killings exercised in Kosova."

The Pristina-based BUJKU newspaper considers the "torturing to death of Shefki Latifi to be an unbridled act of undeclared war" in the "wake of a Serbian police crackdown" in Podujevo. BUJKU notes that "this act of police barbarism is undoubtedly a direct provocation of the Albanian population of the Podujevo region, but also the entire Kosova, a violent response to the policy of nonviolence that the Kosova political and state institutions have been pursuing in their bid to see a quieter future and a negotiated settlement of the Kosova

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issue." BUJKU points out that the "unbridled campaign of a systematic violence of the Serbian occupying regime in Kosova is a further evidence to the permanent dimension of the undeclared war in Kosova, aimed at ethnic cleansing."

BUJKU says that "the Serbian regime's record in Kosova disqualifies any verbal willingness on the part of Serbia to engage in a dialogue to seek a solution to the Kosova issue, while the European and American public opinion has become aware of the need for more concrete steps towards the resolution of the Kosova crisis, and the U.S. warnings over Kosova were clearer than ever."

Sources in Podujevo also report that the secretary of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) branch in Podujevo was released on 4 July after being held "in Serbian police custody for three days." His family members told that LDK Information Commission in Podujevo that "he was treated cruelly while in custody and had to seek medical treatment."

It is reported that a Serbian police patrol in Vucitrn raided the home of an Albanian in Smrekovnic village and sent him to the police station, where he "was threatened" with "heavy repercussions."

It is reported from Mitrovica that the Serbian police summoned an Albanian to report to the police station in Mitrovica, "ill-treating" him on charges "of alleged possession of two hand grenades."

Under the pretext of "arms searches," the Serbian police on 4 July raided the home of an Albanian at Mazhiq village and arrested him.

LDK sources report on 6 July that a Serb citizen and his family broke into the apartment of a municipal LDK Presidency member in Istog.

It is reported that "heavy Serbian police forces besieged the home" of an Albanian at Rezall village and arrested his son, who was taken to the police station in Srbica and "beaten up severely." In connection with "alleged possession of arms," the Serbian police in Klina summoned an Albanian to report to the police station, where he was subject to "police torture." On 3 July, the Serbian police detained a member of the local Youth Forum Presidency and held him in custody overnight. The Serbian police raided the home of three other Albanians from Cerovik village, detained them "for several hours," and physically "tortured" them.

It is reported on 7 July that a Serb family, accompanied by the Serbian police, "broke into the apartment" of a presidency member of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo.

LDK sources in Istog report on 7 July that during June, the Serbian police summoned 39 persons in Istog municipality to so-called police informative talks; raided two Albanian families; tortured five others; and ill-treated 13 other individuals in various forms.

On 3 July, the Serbian border police stopped an Albanian-Swedish citizen and his family and took them to the police station, where they were held for "over five hours." The Serbian police interrogated him "whether he was a political activist in Sweden, as well as other issues in connection with the life of Albanians" there. He told the Kosovo Information Center on 7 July that the Serbian police "seized dozens of publications in Albanian from him" and ordered him to report to the police station in Vranje.

The Serbian police in Suva Reka summoned three Albanians to report to the police station "allegedly in connection with illegal arms possession charges." On 3 July, the Serbian police summoned a member of the LDK Presidency branch in Junik and questioned him for "over two hours" before releasing him.

Sources in Malisevo report that "allegedly in connection with arms possession," the Serbian police summoned an Albanian and his two sons from Ostrozub village and told them to report to the police station "on a daily basis" as of 30 June. On 3 July, the Serbian police raided the homes of two residents at Lladroc village in search for weapons. Under the "pretext of arms possession," the Serbian police in Shtime arrested an Albanian from Raak village this morning.

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